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1Nanotechnology, the science of manufacturing material at the tiny scale, creates new possibil-
ities to make dramatic improvements to our lives.Yet, the uncertain impacts to health, the
environment, and society that may arise with this emerging technology demand our urgent
attention. If we want to ensure that the benefits of nanotechnology far exceed any risks, we
need an oversight system that assures safety while providing transparency for both businesses
and the public.
Over the past two years, nanotechnology has moved dramatically from the lab into the mar-
ketplace.Today, there are more than 450 manufacturer-identified nanotechnology-enabled prod-
ucts in the commercial market and “over 600 raw materials, intermediate components and
industrial equipment items” used by nano manufacturers (U.S. EPA 2007) and many more are
sure to follow, given the large investments in research, development, and commercialization.
These products open a wide array of questions concerning the risk of nanomaterials to work-
ers, consumers, and the environment and provide new challenges to regulatory agencies. If we
expect to see an effective regulatory system for nanotechnology, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and other players must come together today and take the necessary steps to eval-
uate different approaches and move forward with a plan of action.
The author of this report, J. Clarence (Terry) Davies, has thought through and analyzed
many of the nanotechnology regulatory issues and challenges facing the EPA, as well as other
parties such as the Congress. In a prior report, Dr. Davies argued that better and more aggres-
sive oversight and new resources are needed to manage the potential adverse effects of nan-
otechnology and to promote its continued development (Davies 2006). In this report, he
points out weaknesses within the system, and offers solutions. Following a comprehensive
review of EPA’s experience regulating nano-based substances and products, Dr. Davies evalu-
ates various environmental management and policy tools and proposes a number of innova-
tive regulatory and non-regulatory approaches.
The intention of this report is to stimulate a broad dialogue about a next-generation over-
sight system that will work with nanotechnologies and the technologies that follow. The
report contains a number of action items for government, industry, and other stakeholders in
both the near and long term. Finally, it challenges EPA to rethink its role, resources, and capa-
bilities and provides a starting point for a discussion about environmental protection in the
21st century.
—David Rejeski
Director, Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies
Foreword
 
3This paper focuses on the need for an oversight system for nanotechnology that will identi-
fy any potential adverse health or environmental effects of the technology and prevent them
from occurring. It analyzes the steps that must be taken to create such a system, particularly
emphasizing the role of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
I have discussed broad possible approaches to nano oversight, not just approaches within
EPA’s current legislative authority. New approaches are needed, and I have tried to stimulate
ideas for what the new approaches might be.Also, I have discussed broad areas in which, in
my opinion, EPA needs to change. Nano requires specific changes within the agency, but my
hope is that nano will be a catalyst that will revitalize all of the agency’s functions.
I am grateful to the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies for its generous support and
encouragement, and also to Resources for the Future for its continuing support. Dave
Rejeski, Julia Moore, and Andrew Maynard of the Wilson Center were tremendously help-
ful in all aspects of producing this report. Deanna Lekas and Evan Michelson provided very
useful research support, and Deanna ably and diligently shepherded the report through every
stage of its creation. Four outside reviewers—Dan Fiorino, Monroe Newman, Barry Rabe,
and Rena Steinzor—gave me excellent comments within an unreasonably short deadline. I
am very much in their debt.As usual, for better or worse, responsibility for everything in the
report, other than the conditions that exist in the real world, belongs solely to the author.
—J. Clarence (Terry) Davies
Author’s Preface
 
Nanotechnology has enormous potential to improve everyone’s life. For the potential to be
realized, the new technology must be subject to an adequate oversight system, a system
designed to identify and prevent any adverse effects of nano on health or the environment.
It has been estimated that, by 2014, 15% of all goods manufactured globally will involve nan-
otechnology.The accelerating pace of nano discoveries and new products means that time
is running short for the establishment of an oversight system.Action is needed now.
This paper identifies many of the actions that should be taken. It focuses in particular on
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which will be a key agency in any over-
sight effort because of its numerous regulatory authorities and its mission to protect the
environment and human health.
A review of existing EPA authorities reveals a large number of weaknesses. In particular,
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which is the only law potentially capable of pro-
viding general oversight for nanotechnology, is extremely deficient in many respects and
needs to be amended. But moving beyond TSCA, virtually every authority that EPA has at
its disposal has weaknesses in terms of nanotechnology oversight.
The nanotechnology revolution provides an opportunity to institute new kinds of regu-
lation, to create an oversight system for nano that will be more effective but less intrusive
than existing forms of regulation and that will require fewer resources from both the pub-
lic and private sectors.The report discusses a variety of tools that will need to be combined
in a nano oversight system—information tools, voluntary efforts, economic tools, and liabil-
ity. It also discusses the role of state and local governments, and public participation. It out-
lines nine different examples of the ways the tools could be used.The optimal mix needs to
be determined by a dialogue among the affected parties, including manufacturers, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, EPA, and consumers.
Nanotechnology can also be a catalyst for the revitalization of EPA, an opportunity to
bring the agency into the 21st century.The major areas that require strengthening are sci-
ence, program integration, personnel, international activities, and program evaluation.
Inadequate resources, both money and trained people, is a problem for EPA as it is for all
federal regulatory agencies.
The report concludes with an action agenda that contains more than 25 actions that need
to be taken to improve the oversight of nanotechnologies (see Table ES.1). EPA, Congress,
the president, the National Nanotechnology Initiative, and the nanotechnology industry
each have steps they should take. A number of the steps are aimed at increasing both the
amount and the focus of research on nano’s health and environmental effects. More research
is urgently needed, but the gaps in knowledge should not be used as an excuse to delay work
on an oversight system.There will always be gaps in knowledge. An oversight system will
help fill the gaps.
The most important next steps are, first, to equip TSCA to deal with nano by changing
both the law and the current TSCA regulations, and, second, to get started on the new reg-
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ulatory approach by convening a dialogue of stakeholders to formulate the outlines of a next-
generation oversight system appropriate for 21st-century technologies.With new nanoprod-
ucts being commercialized each week, we need a system now for considering whether the
products pose a risk.This report provides an agenda for creating that system and for ensuring
that society is prepared as nanotechnology advances.
6
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Proposed Agenda Items for the Next 1 to 2 Years 
1. NNI revise its research plan for nano health and environmental effects.
2. Congress amend the National Nanotechnology for the Twenty-First Century Act to require NNI
to issue a research plan for health and environmental effects every three years.
3. EPA and/or NIEHS initiate discussions with nano companies about creation of a joint government-
industry nano effects research institute.
4. Congress increase funding for strategically targeted research on health and environmental
effects of nano to at least $50 million annually.
5. Industry, environmental groups, and other stakeholders begin a dialogue.
6. EPA launch its nano voluntary program.
7. EPA formulate changes to TSCA to deal with nano. 
8. EPA promulgate a significant new use rule under TSCA that covers all nanomaterials.
9. EPA formulate and implement an internal coordination plan for nano. 
10. EPA work with FDA, OSHA, CPSC, and USDA to create an interagency nano regulatory coor-
dinating group. 
11. Congress request that the GAO conduct a study of what other nations are doing with respect
to nano regulation and oversight.
12. NNI establish and publish evaluation metrics.
13. NNI commission a study on the economics of nano. 
14. NNI commission a study of the pros and cons of labeling nanomaterials and nanoproducts. 
15. Congress establish a temporary committee in each house to consider options for a regulatory
mechanism for nano. 
16. The president and Congress convene an EPA Modernization Commission. 
17. Congress commission GAO to study what resources federal agencies are currently devoting to
nano health and safety, both research and regulation, and then conduct a hearing to consider
whether these resources are adequate.
18. NNI, with funding primarily from NSF, increase its public education and participation efforts.
19. EPA re-establish a policy office with responsibilities for coordinating agency programs, evaluat-
ing programs and measuring progress toward agency goals.
20. Congress hold hearings to amend the Federal Advisory Committee Act to facilitate public 
participation.
21. Congress amend the National Nanotechnology Act to facilitate NNI funding the priorities it
identifies. 
22. The Nanotechnology Effects Institute begin operation; Congress provide separate funding for
the Institute in the EPA or NIEHS budget.
23. Congress amend TSCA to remove the constraints that make rulemaking nearly impossible, 
to change the criterion for judicial review to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, to require
manufacturers to produce enough data, and to authorize EPA to share confidential business
information with states and foreign governments, provided the data are adequately protected.
24. The White House consider the recommendations of the EPA Modernization Commission for
implementation.
25. Trade associations establish industry codes of conduct related to nano. 
26. EPA, working with the State Department and other relevant agencies, fully support the OECD
mechanisms for exchange of nano research results. 
TABLE ES.1. PROPOSED ACTIONS 
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Note: For further detail on these agenda items, see Chapter V. For acronyms used, see list at end of report.
Row shading corresponds with lead organization for each action item.
Key: NNI = n Congress = n EPA = n White House = n Nano industry = n
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Dr. Davies, a senior advisor to the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies and a senior fel-
low at Resources for the Future, is one of the foremost authorities on environmental
research and policy. He helped pioneer the related fields of risk assessment, risk manage-
ment, and risk communication, and his work has advanced our understanding of cross-
media pollution, the tendency of pollutants to move across boundaries, from air to water to
land, revealing shortcomings in the legal and regulatory framework.
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President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, he co-authored the plan that cre-
ated EPA. Dr. Davies also was Executive Vice President of The Conservation Foundation, a
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was elected a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
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Dr.Davies is the author of The Politics of Pollution,Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal,
Pollution Control in the United States, and several other books and monographs addressing
environmental policy issues. He authored the report, Managing the Effects of Nanotechnology,
released in January 2006 by the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies. A political scien-
tist by training, Dr. Davies received his B.A. in American government from Dartmouth
College, and his Ph.D. in American government from Columbia University. He taught at
Princeton University and Bowdoin College, and has helped mentor a generation of envi-
ronmental policy researchers.
About the Author

Nanotechnology has enormous potential to
improve life. In a few decades, almost every
aspect of our existence, from the clothes we
wear to the food we eat, from the cars we
drive to the buildings we live in, is likely to
be changed for the better by nano. However,
if the potential for good is to be realized,
society must also face nano’s potential for
harm.This paper is intended to provide some
guidance about how to prevent harm from
occurring, thereby allowing nano’s positive
potential to become a reality.
This paper focuses on the U.S. Enviro-
nmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its
role in dealing with the potential adverse
effects of nano. EPA administers more laws
that are relevant to nano than does any other
agency.The federal law that potentially could
have the broadest coverage of nanomaterials
is the Toxic Substances Control Act, adminis-
tered by EPA. EPA is doing more research on
nano than is any other regulatory agency. It
will inevitably be a central player in the
unfolding drama of nano’s development.
Other federal agencies and many other
organizations are involved with nano. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration are the two other federal agencies most
involved in regulating nano, and they also will
be major players in any oversight system that
develops. The Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars already has published a
paper on nano and FDA (Taylor 2006).
Definition of Nanotechnology 
The definition of nanotechnology is both
controversial and consequential. It is contro-
versial because there is, as yet, no consensus
about how to define it and because how it is
defined has important implications for how it
is managed and marketed. Several interna-
tional organizations that deal with standards
are working on nano definitions, and their
work may result in greater agreement.
All the nano definitions based on the
physics and chemistry of the technology relate
to size. Everyone agrees that nano is the tech-
nology of the very small—the manipulation of
things at the level of individual atoms and mol-
ecules. The U.S. National Nanotechnology
Initiative (NNI), the interagency effort to
coordinate federal funding for nano research
and development, defines nanotechnology as
“the understanding and control of matter at
dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers”
(www.nano.gov, accessed 9/18/06). A
nanometer is a billionth of a meter. A human
hair is 60,000–120,000 nanometers wide. A
red blood cell is 2,000–5,000 nanometers wide
(ibid.).Things at the nanoscale can be seen only
with techniques such as super-magnifying
scanning tunnel microscopes, which were first
used in the mid-1980s (www.nano.gov/
html/facts/home_facts.html).
In the context of legislation and regulation,
the sources and types of nano are important.
Different sources and uses will be regulated
under different laws and in different ways.
From this perspective, we can describe five
categories of nano materials, processes, and
products:
1. There are nanoparticles that come from
natural processes or that exist in nature.
Sea spray contains nano-size particles, and
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many natural combustion processes give
off similarly small particles. Most viruses
are nano-size. Particles in this category are
generally not considered to be part of
nanotechnology because they are not
made intentionally, but they help inform
our understanding of the products of nan-
otechnology, and how they might affect
health and the environment.
2. There are nanoparticles that are incidental
by-products of human activity.Welding,
for example, gives off nano-size particles.
Exhaust from diesel and gasoline-fueled
vehicles contains nano-size particles. As
with nanoparticles from natural processes,
these are not considered to be products of
nanotechnology, although the particles
may have the same health and environ-
mental effects.
3. There are nano manufacturing process-
es that are often,but not necessarily,used for
making nanomaterials.New types of micro-
scopes and new ways of handling minute
amounts of materials have made it possible
to put things together atom by atom.These
techniques are used for making filters, sen-
sors, electronic and computer components,
and many other products. In theory, they
could be used to build anything.
4. There are particular types of nanomate-
rials that have been developed in recent
years to take advantage of the unique
properties of nano. They can be made
from a variety of substances (e.g., carbon,
titanium, gold). Nanomaterials include
things such as nanotubes, quantum dots,
and nanocrystals.
5. A fifth category is nanoproducts, products
that contain nanomaterials. Commercial-
ization of nano has proceeded rapidly. In
early 2007, the Project on Emerging Nano-
technologies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars found
almost 400 manufacturer-identified nano-
products on the market, including clothing,
golf clubs, and milkshakes. Sixty-seven of
these products are cosmetics, the largest sin-
gle category, and another 18 are sunscreen
preparations(www.nanotechproject.org/
consumer, accessed 2/7/07).The consult-
ing firm EmTech Research estimated in
2005 that in addition to the consumer
products there are more than 600 nano raw
materials, intermediate components, and
industrial equipment items that are used by
manufacturers (U.S.EPA 2007,p.4).No fig-
ure is available for non-consumer nano-
products on the market, such as medical
devices, ceramics, and industrial filters.The
number is certainly in the hundreds, and
probably over a thousand. Nano-based cat-
alysts have become an integral part of oil
refining. And many of the lights in athletic
stadiums are based on nanotechnology.
Each of these categories poses different
challenges and questions. Natural nanoprod-
ucts can generally be disregarded in the con-
text of regulation. Some of the human activ-
ities that produce nano by-products are
already regulated, although the regulations do
not focus specifically on nano-size particles.
For example, automobile emissions are regu-
lated under the Clean Air Act.
Nano manufacturing processes are likely to
be regulated under EPA media programs (see
Chapter II). Nanomaterials and nanoproducts,
the major focus of this report,would be prima-
rily regulated by EPA product programs, such
as the Toxic Substances Control Act, but could
also be covered by some media programs, for
example, when products are discarded.
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Nano Promise and Red Flags
We are just at the threshold of seeing the
ways in which nano can be useful. Every
major area of human activity is likely to be
deeply affected by the new technology.
Carbon nanotubes are around 100 times as
strong as steel but weigh only about one-
tenth as much. Nano windows that never
need washing are on the market now, as are
nano batteries and solar panels that are
much more efficient than pre-nano ones.
Nano will enable us to make filters that fil-
ter almost anything (thus, for example, dras-
tically reducing the cost and energy con-
sumption of desalinating water), sensors that
sense almost anything (greatly improving
airport security), and photon computer
chips that will revolutionize what comput-
ers can do. Nano drugs will vastly increase
the range and effectiveness of medical inter-
ventions, and nano foods will be more
nutritious, tastier, and less subject to
spoilage. The list could go on and on. Not
all of these applications will be realized, and
hyperbole is tempting when describing
powerful new technologies, but the vast
promise of nano is clear.
Lux Research, the authoritative commer-
cial source of nano information, estimates
that, worldwide, nano was incorporated in
$30 billion of manufactured goods in 2005,
which more than doubled the amount in the
previous year. It estimates that by 2014 the
figure will be $2.6 trillion, a more-than-85-
fold increase (Lux Research 2006, p. iii).
The potential of nano to contribute posi-
tively to society is hard to exaggerate, but this
potential could be undermined if society
neglects dealing with potential health and
environmental problems that might be
caused by nano. The studies done to date
show “a number of red flags that indicate
some engineered nanomaterials present a
new or unusual health hazard” (Maynard
2006b,p.7; also see Maynard 2006c).Some of
these potential hazards are discussed below.
Laboratory animals experienced respira-
tory problems following high exposure to
nanotubes (Warheit at al. 2004; Lam et al.
2004). Nanoparticles when inhaled can enter
the bloodstream and may also circumvent the
blood-brain barrier, thus affecting the central
nervous system (Oberdörster et al. 2004;
Elder et al. 2006), and dermal exposure may
cause inflammation in the lymph system
(Oberdörster et al. 2005). Skin exposure to
nanoscale titanium dioxide in sunscreens
could damage DNA and harm already dam-
aged skin (Dunford et al. 1997). Mice
exposed by ingestion to nanoscale copper
particles suffered “heavy injuries” to the kid-
ney, liver, and spleen (Chen et al. 2006).Nano
zinc powders produced more renal damage
and anemia than exposure to microscale zinc
powders (Wang et al. 2006).There is a lot of
uncertainty about the importance of these
findings, but the more studies that are done,
the more red flags get hoisted.
Very few studies have looked at potential
environmental damage from nanomaterials.
Oberdörster (2004) did suggest that large-
mouth bass exposed to uncoated fullerenes (a
type of nanomaterial) experienced inflam-
mation, perhaps resulting from nanoparticles
being transported to the brain. The wide-
spread use of nano bactericides such as silver
has raised a variety of questions about how
nanoparticles will affect the environment
(Kinney 2006).
A very important point that emerges
from the studies of nano is that the human
and environmental toxicity of nanomaterials
seems dependent on a variety of different
characteristics of the material. Even before
getting to what tests to perform, there are
major difficulties in knowing what charac-
13EPA and Nanotechnology: Oversight for the 21st Century
 
teristics should be used to describe the mate-
rial being tested. As Maynard (2006b, p. 7)
states, “Unlike many conventional materials,
the relevant characteristics of engineered
nanomaterials may be non-obvious and non-
trivial to quantify. In constructing a frame-
work for nanomaterials toxicity testing,
Oberdörster et al. . . . recommend sixteen
physicochemical parameters that should be
evaluated in toxicity tests—a far cry from the
two or three usually measured. These range
from surface area and surface chemistry to
particle size distribution and particle charge.
Engineered nanomaterials are notoriously
difficult to characterize—even two materials
that are notionally the same may have subtle
but significant differences that determine
their behavior.”
This aspect of nano greatly complicates
the task of determining which materials can
or will cause problems. It requires more test-
ing of each kind of material but, most impor-
tant, it suggests that tests should be per-
formed on almost every individual product
because small changes in product characteris-
tics can have large implications for toxicity.
Other possible complexities emerge from
the relatively small number of tests that have
been done on nano effects. One area that has
major ramifications for the existing regulato-
ry structure involves the number of nanopar-
ticles to which a person or the environment
is exposed.All current regulations have as an
unstated premise that the larger the dose, the
greater the risk.The opposite may be true for
some types of nanomaterials under some
conditions. They may have a tendency to
clump together, and the more they clump,
the less likely it may be that they will pene-
trate skin or cause other kinds of exposure or
toxicity. To the extent that this is true, it
would mean that if someone were exposed
to a nanomaterial, he or she would be better
off being exposed to a larger amount of the
material, the opposite of the premise of cur-
rent standards.
There have been no known cases of peo-
ple or the environment being harmed by
nanomaterials. In Germany, a score of people
suffered respiratory problems after using a
new product called “Nano Magic,” but on
investigation it seems that the product did
not actually contain any nanomaterials
(vonBubnoff 2006). However, there is ample
evidence from laboratory tests on nano and
from past experience with other materials
that the potential adverse effects of nano
must be investigated and that an adequate
system for both identifying and managing
such effects must be put in place.This should
be done with some urgency because the new
technology is being commercialized and put
to use at a very rapid pace.
Setting an Agenda
This report is primarily an agenda-setting
document. It describes and analyzes what has
to be considered in constructing an oversight
system for the identification and prevention
of any adverse effects from nano. It outlines
what has to be considered in reinvigorating
EPA and equipping it to deal with nano. It
concludes by providing an agenda of action
items for nano over the next few years.
The broad public policy options for nano
oversight provide the context for the agenda.
To simplify, there are three options: (1) do
nothing in regard to nano oversight; (2) just do
research on applications and risk; or (3) begin
to formulate and implement a regulatory sys-
tem for nano while continuing to do research.
The do-nothing option is a prescription
for trouble. It leaves the public open to
potential adverse effects from nanoproducts
14
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because the current system is not equipped
to deal with risks from nanomaterials. It
leaves industry open to a potential backlash
from a public that feels unprotected and from
insurers and investors unable to measure their
risk. It fuels the Katrina syndrome, i.e., the
perception that the government is incapable
of dealing with any significant challenge.
The research-only option is the primary
current policy. Research on the effects of
nano is absolutely necessary, and the govern-
ment should be supporting more of it. But
research without a system to manage the
effects of nano invites the same trouble as the
do-nothing option. Furthermore, a nano reg-
ulatory system may be necessary to get the
scientific information needed for intelligent
oversight (see Chapter II).
We need to start considering regulatory
options, the third alternative. Many
approaches are possible, and the dangers of
regulation should be borne in mind. Nano is
still very much an evolving technology, and a
cumbersome or overly intrusive regulatory
system could prevent nano from reaching its
full potential. The new technology calls for
new regulatory approaches, and this report is
intended to help answer that call.
Chapter II describes the current situation
with respect to nano and EPA. It describes
relevant EPA laws and programs and analyzes
their adequacy—in terms of legal authority,
resources, and political will.
Chapter III analyzes the tools available to
manage any adverse effects of nano. These
tools include modification of existing laws
and regulations, generation and use of infor-
mation, voluntary efforts, economic and lia-
bility tools, state and local government
efforts, and formulation of new kinds of
oversight. Public participation must be a part
of any of these efforts.The chapter concludes
with some criteria for choosing tools but also
points out that a dialogue among the inter-
ested parties is the only way in which a viable
nano regulatory program can be formulated.
Chapter IV deals with EPA and ways in
which it might be rejuvenated. I emphasize the
role of science, the need for integration, the
need to attract good people, the international
context, and the importance of evaluation.
Chapter V is a list of action items for the
next few years. Most of them are discussed in
the earlier chapters, but the list is supple-
mented by additional suggestions.The chap-
ter gives a time frame for the recommenda-
tions and assigns specific responsibility for
initiating action on each item.
Although the report is premised on the
need to do more to identify, manage, and
prevent any nano adverse effects, it does not
advocate a specific overall proposal. It is a
compilation of things to consider, experi-
ences to ponder, and steps that can be taken
to advance toward an intelligent oversight
approach. It is a beginning, not an end.
Nano has vast potential. That potential is
being realized at a fast pace, but it is probably
not without its dangers.What is being done
with respect to anticipating, identifying, and
managing the effects of nano on health and
the environment? In the next chapter, I
describe the current situation, focusing par-
ticularly on EPA.
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There is now a great deal of activity with
respect to nano. Most of it is focused on dis-
covering and developing new knowledge,
some is on basic science, but much of it is
focused on practical applications that will be
commercially profitable. Some research is
being done on the health effects of nano, and
there is a small amount of regulatory activity
arising from the operations of programs (pes-
ticides, fuel additives, etc.) that were created
before nano was on anyone’s agenda.
I will look first at how the science and
regulation are related, a knotty problem. I
then turn to the existing EPA laws and pro-
grams: what they are, how they apply to
nano, and how adequate they are for dealing
with potential nano problems.
Science and Regulation
Almost everyone agrees that we do not know
enough about the health and environmental
effects of nanotechnology. But enough for
what purpose? Will we ever know enough?
What can or should be done based on the
knowledge we have now?
The relationship between science and
regulation is complex. Science can be distort-
ed to bolster arguments for a particular regu-
latory outcome (Wagner and Steinzor 2006).
Regulatory outcomes can be skewed by poor
science (Powell 1999). Good science can be
encouraged or discouraged by regulation.
A fundamental dilemma with respect to
nano is that the existing science is clearly
inadequate to manage the potential adverse
effects of the technology. We do not know
much about what adverse effects to look for,
and there is no consensus on the type of data
necessary to determine adverse effects.We do
not know enough to identify the materials
and products that are safe and that do not
require regulatory scrutiny and management.
Some groups have concluded that because
the science is inadequate there should be a
moratorium on marketing nanoproducts, or
even a moratorium on nano research (see
Davies 2006, p. 22).This is one way to inter-
pret the “precautionary principle” (see
Durant in Durant et al. 2004). There are,
however, many other interpretations, and the
most helpful ones inevitably involve striking
a balance between the harm that could be
done by proceeding with an innovation and
the harm that could be done by not proceed-
ing. In my view, and the view of most others,
based on what is currently known, the bal-
ance argues against any kind of general
moratorium.Testing can be done on individ-
ual nano materials and products, and judg-
ments on limiting production or marketing
should be based on the results of these tests.
The traditional toxicological approach of
exposing mice or rats to the substance in
question may work as well for testing nano-
materials as for conventional materials (see
ILSI 2005). What we do not know are the
key variables that determine toxicity, what
kinds of toxic effects are most likely to occur
from what kinds of nanomaterials, and how
traditional toxicological principles, such as
dose-response relationships, apply to nano.
Much of the missing scientific knowledge
cuts across different nanomaterials and
nanoproducts. A lot of this knowledge will
have to be generated by government funding
and will be done by university and govern-
II. The Current Situation
 
ment laboratories. However, if the science is
to be adequate, there will need to be testing
of specific materials and products.The scope
of what effects and what materials are of
concern cannot be determined in the
abstract—it will require specifics based on
testing of individual samples.
The manufacturers of nano materials and
products can be relied on to do some testing
out of self-interest. No company wants to
injure its workers or have its consumers die
from use of a product.Thus, most companies
will test their products for acute toxic
effects—those effects that are obvious and that
happen within a short time of being exposed.
Long-term chronic health effects and
environmental effects are a different story.
For effects such as cancer, which can take 20
years to manifest itself, or genetic damage,
which may not show up until the next gen-
eration, or environmental effects, which may
not become apparent for decades, there is
very little incentive for companies to do test-
ing.Testing for such effects is often expensive,
and it is only rarely possible to tie a specific
product to an adverse effect.The few excep-
tions are when a material results in a unique
type of effect (e.g., asbestos and mesothe-
lioma) or when scientific serendipity con-
nects an identifiable material to an identifi-
able effect (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons and
depletion of stratospheric ozone).
It is hard to see what will motivate manu-
facturers to carry out chronic and environ-
mental testing if regulation does not require it.
A study by the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology surveyed 32 Swiss and German
manufacturers of nanoproducts. Only two of
them had investigated the effects of absorption
of nanoparticles by living organisms. Three-
quarters admitted they had not carried out
risk assessments on their products (nanotech-
wire.com/news, 3/22/06). Wendy Wagner
(2004) has persuasively described the reasons
why it may not be in the rational interest of
manufacturers to do health and environmen-
tal testing.
The dilemma is that the science needed to
prescribe intelligent testing requirements is
lacking, but that without requirements the
needed science will not be forthcoming. It is
a classic catch-22.
The dilemma is similar to that faced by the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) new
chemicals program. Because of weaknesses in
the Act, the only data that EPA gets on most
new chemicals is their chemical structure, i.e.,
their molecular composition. However, the
agency is required to review each new chem-
ical and, presumably, to do some kind of
assessment of whether or not it poses a risk to
health or the environment. Faced with the
need to determine the chemical’s biological
and environmental activity, but with only the
chemical’s structure to work from, the agency
has come to rely on what it calls “structure-
activity relationship,” or SAR. SAR involves
comparing the molecular structure of the
new chemical with the molecular structure of
existing chemicals whose health and environ-
mental effects are known. From this compar-
ison, EPA infers the potential effects of the
new chemical.
There is not a lot of empirical basis for
SAR, and the one major empirical examina-
tion of its validity found that it was moder-
ately accurate for some effects but not at all
accurate for others (U.S. EPA 1993). For
example, it was correct only 57% of the time
when predicting systemic toxicity (ibid. p.
49). Furthermore, it consistently tended to
underestimate health effects (ibid. p. 50).
However, SAR has allowed both EPA and
the chemical industry to defend the TSCA
program and to claim that it adequately pro-
tects the public.
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In theory, it might be possible for EPA to
deal with the nano dilemma by using SAR,
since TSCA is the Act on which the agency
is primarily relying for managing nano.
However, in addition to the inherent limita-
tions of SAR, it is even more limited with
respect to nanomaterials because evidence
indicates that the biological activity and
effects of nano are in part dependent on
characteristics other than chemical structure,
such as size, physical form, and surface area
(Maynard 2006b).
Another way out of the dilemma, and in
my view a more scientifically defensible
approach, would be to focus on exposure. If
people are not exposed to a material and it
does not get into the environment, then there
is no need to worry about its health or envi-
ronmental effects. Rather than ask manufac-
turers to test for effects, the government
could ask for evidence that there will not be
exposure to the material. Such evidence
would have to include an analysis of the
entire life cycle of the material, but such
analysis would still be less expensive and dif-
ficult than testing for effects.
The exposure approach will not work for
all materials because there will be some, such
as cosmetics or food additives, that inevitably
involve exposure, and others where exposure
will occur because the material will get into
the environment after it has been discarded.
Also, in many, perhaps most, cases, regulations
will have to be promulgated to ensure that
the workers at the manufacturing plant will
not be exposed.
Research by government, universities, and
industry may provide the scientific basis for
determining the safety of some major nano
materials and products. International cooper-
ation will be important because the magni-
tude of the scientific task will be more man-
ageable if it is shared by several countries.
Nevertheless, it is likely that some form of
regulatory incentive will be necessary to get
test data from manufacturers. In Chapter III,
I discuss some of the ways in which this
might be done. Many of these ways involve
EPA’s current programs.
EPA Product Programs and 
Media Programs
EPA, like most federal agencies, is an amal-
gam of different programs, each with its own
legal basis, mission, history, and culture. How
many EPA programs exist is a number that
varies with definitions. Estimates range from
8 or 10 to 90 or 100.
A basic distinction among EPA programs is
between product programs and media pro-
grams.The media programs are the ones most
familiar to the public—clean air, clean water,
hazardous-waste disposal.They regulate some
segment of the environment and deal prima-
rily with wastes.The product programs—pes-
ticide registration, toxic substances control—as
the term implies regulate some kind of engi-
neered or manufactured product.The distinc-
tion is not always sharp. For example, regula-
tion of drinking water, which EPA shares with
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA reg-
ulates bottled water), has characteristics of
both a product and a media program.
The product-media distinction is impor-
tant for managing nano because the two
types of programs address different parts of
the nano life cycle and the problems posed by
nano for product programs differ from those
posed for media programs. Figure 2.1 shows
a simplified version of the nano life cycle and
the EPA programs that relate to each stage
(also see Wardak et al. 2006, Lekas 2005).
Among the many questions that need to be
raised are where in the life cycle the most
serious health and environmental problems
would be likely to arise, and where interdic-
 
tion to prevent adverse effects would likely
be most effective in protecting health and the
environment and least disruptive to innova-
tion and commercialization.
We do not yet know enough about the
potential adverse effects of nano to know
where the most serious problems are likely to
occur.We do not even know for certain that
there are potential problems, although it
would be extraordinary and unprecedented if
there were not, given a technology as broad
and powerful as nano.
Because of the nature of nanomaterials—
their small size and high value—it is likely to
be more effective to regulate them under the
EPA product programs than under the media
programs.At present there are no good ways
to monitor nanomaterials in ambient air or
water, and this in itself makes it impossible to
regulate them under the Clean Air Act
(CAA) or Clean Water Act (CWA). However,
even if economical and accurate ways of
measuring nanomaterials in air and water are
developed (and it is possible that sensors
using nano devices will solve the monitoring
problem), it will still be more practical and
efficient to require product designs and han-
dling requirements that prevent dangerous
nanomaterials from getting into the ambient
environment. Developing and requiring
technologies to remove nanomaterials from
ambient environments is likely to be difficult,
expensive, and less effective than regulating
nanoproducts.
A product-based oversight system demands
more government resources than a media-
based system.Also, as Mark Greenwood (2007,
p. 20) has noted, “the information require-
ments for nanoscale materials are likely to be
more extensive than those currently expected
for conventional forms of the same materials,”
making a product focus even more expensive.
However, a product focus is essential for ade-
quate nano oversight.
Disposal and recycling are stages of the
product life cycle where it may be difficult to
take preventive steps by regulating products.
Nanoproducts can be designed to prevent the
nanomaterial from getting into the environ-
ment (e.g., by requiring it to be chemically
and physically combined with other materi-
als), but when the product is discarded the
design protections may cease to be effective.
Nanomaterials used in automobile bodies,
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for example, are chemically bound to other
materials and thus are not likely to be released
to the environment. However, when the
auto’s useful life is ended it may be shredded
or burned or subject to other processes that
might release the nanomaterials. We need to
know more before we can tell whether or not
this is a serious problem.
Many federal government programs deal-
ing with specific nanoproducts are in agencies
other than EPA. For example, food additives
and packaging, drugs and medical devices,
and cosmetics are all regulated by the FDA
(see Taylor 2006). EPA has three product-reg-
ulation programs: TSCA, which regulates
chemicals; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which regu-
lates pesticides; and section 211 of the CAA,
which regulates automobile fuel additives.
The agency has placed primary reliance for
dealing with nano on TSCA.
TSCA is a product program in that it deals
with manufactured materials, not wastes, and
it is not limited to any particular part of the
environment. Its new chemicals authority
applies to chemicals before they are manufac-
tured. This is different from most product
statutes, which apply to products before they
are marketed. The pre-manufacturing cover-
age of TSCA allows occupational exposures
to be covered (and encouraged organized
labor to support passage of the legislation),
but it has proved cumbersome and ineffective.
EPA has to review a large number of chemi-
cals that are never commercialized, and the
agency generally has not been able to use
TSCA to protect workers.
The pre-market application of most prod-
uct statutes has raised questions about
whether there should be greater authority to
monitor and take action after the product has
been marketed (see Taylor 2006). The EPA
product programs do give authority for post-
market actions. Section 8 of TSCA gives
broad authority to EPA to require chemical
manufacturers and distributors to maintain
records on such things as health and environ-
mental effects, levels of exposure, and meth-
ods of disposal. Section 8(e) states, “Any per-
son who manufactures, processes, or distrib-
utes in commerce a chemical substance or
mixture and who obtains information which
reasonably supports the conclusion that such
substance or mixture presents a substantial
risk of injury to health or the environment
shall immediately inform the [EPA]
Administrator of such information. . . . ”The
registration of pesticides regulated under
FIFRA expires after five years, thus providing
an opportunity to review any new data.Also,
the EPA Administrator is authorized to sus-
pend or cancel a registration at any time if she
believes that the product is causing adverse
effects, and she may conditionally register a
pesticide for a period of time “sufficient for
generation and submission of required data”
(FIFRA sec. 136). The section of the CAA
regulating fuel additives (sec. 211) allows EPA
to prohibit the sale of a fuel additive at any
time if its costs exceed its benefits and, in this
connection, to obtain data from motor vehi-
cle engine manufacturers (sec. 211(c)(3)(A)).
Legal Authority of EPA Programs 
to Cover Nano
The following five elements need to be con-
sidered in evaluating whether EPA’s programs
are up to the task of managing any adverse
effects of nano:
1. Is there legal authority to cover nano? 
2. Is the legal authority adequate to collect
the information and take the steps neces-
sary to prevent adverse effects from occur-
ring?
 
3. Is the available technical and scientific
information sufficient to implement the
legal authorities? 
4. Are there sufficient resources to imple-
ment the legal authorities? 
5. Is there the political will to address nano
effects? 
I will discuss each of these elements in turn.
There have been two reviews of EPA’s laws to
determine whether they are broad enough to
cover nano. Both efforts have generally con-
cluded that EPA’s statutory authorities can
cover nano.
In May 2005, the Environmental Law
Institute (ELI) and the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies (PEN) convened a two-
day meeting of 40 noted scientists, lawyers,
and policymakers to discuss “Securing the
Promise of Nanotechnology: Is U.S. Envir-
onmental Law Up to the Job?”1 The meeting
did not seek consensus conclusions, but the
views of most participants were reflected in
ELI’s comments on EPA’s draft nano white
paper: “Because there are no nanotechnolo-
gy-specific laws and regulations, and the
enactment of new nanotechnology legisla-
tion related to environmental, health, and
safety is unlikely, at least in the near term, it
will be necessary to use existing legal
authorities and adapt current programs to
regulate nanotechnologies” (ELI 2006).
In 2006, the American Bar Association’s
(ABA’s) Section of Environment, Energy,
and Resources issued a series of papers
reviewing the legal authority of various EPA
programs to deal with nano. Six of the seven
papers contain a detailed analysis of a partic-
ular EPA law.The seventh deals with innova-
tive regulatory approaches (ABA 2006d).
The general conclusions are remarkably sim-
ilar: the CAA “contains sufficient authority”
to adequately address nano (ABA 2006a);
under the CWA,“EPA likely has the author-
ity to regulate nanoparticles” (ABA 2006c);
under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), “the existing statutory frame-
work is readily adaptable to nanomaterials”
(ABA 2006b); the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) “has expansive
authority . . . to regulate discarded wastes
that might include nanoscale materials”
(ABA 2006f);“EPA has considerable author-
ity under FIFRA to prohibit, condition, or
allow the manufacture and use of nanopesti-
cides” (ABA 2006e); and “nanomaterials can
be ‘chemical substances’ that can be regulat-
ed under TSCA” (ABA 2006g).
That a particular law covers nano does not
mean that it covers it adequately, a question I
will discuss in the next section. It also does
not mean that major changes in regulation
and interpretations will not be necessary to
apply the law to nano. For example, the ABA
report on the CAA points out that “current-
ly, all CAA standards are based upon mass
limitations whether mass concentrations,
such as nanograms per cubic meter, or mass
limitations, such as tons per year. It does not
appear as though nanoparticulate can be
effectively regulated in terms of mass . . .
nanoparticles must be measured in terms of
number, rather than mass” (ABA 2006a). In
other words, the basic standard-setting metric
used in the CAA does not work for nano.
The major debate about legal coverage of
nano has centered on the question of whether
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1.A summary of the meeting is available at www.elistore.org/reports.
nanomaterials are “new chemicals” as defined
by TSCA.The debate is important because it is
somewhat easier for EPA to regulate new
chemicals than existing ones.TSCA (sec. 3(2))
defines a chemical as “any organic or inorgan-
ic substance of a particular molecular identity.”
A new chemical is one that is not listed on
EPA’s inventory of existing chemicals (sec.
3(9)). Almost all the raw materials of which
nanomaterials are composed (e.g., gold, car-
bon, titanium) are on the existing chemicals
inventory.The molecular identity of the nano-
material is, in most cases, the same as that of
the raw material, and thus it would seem that
most nanomaterials are not “new chemicals,”
even though they may have different biologi-
cal and ecological effects than the substance in
bulk form.2 As discussed below in the section
on EPA experience regulating nano, of the 15
nanomaterials reviewed in 2005 under TSCA,
EPA found that 14 were not new chemicals.
Although most nanomaterials probably do
not meet the TSCA definition of a new
chemical, TSCA provides an alternative way
to oversee nanomaterials. It allows EPA to
designate specific new uses of existing chem-
icals and to treat such new uses almost the
same way as new chemicals are treated. In des-
ignating new uses, the EPA administrator
must consider the projected volume of pro-
duction of the substance, changes in degree or
patterns of human and environmental expo-
sure, and the anticipated manner and methods
of manufacturing, processing, distributing, and
disposing of the substance (TSCA sec.
5(a)(2)).
Most, if not all, nanomaterials could be
designated under the significant new use
provisions, although designation has to be
done by promulgating a rule. If the law
requires the agency to issue a separate rule
for each individual nanomaterial, the new
use provision would not be very helpful
because there are so many different nanoma-
terials. It is an open question whether EPA
could designate all nanomaterials or selected
classes of nanomaterials by issuing one single
rule. EPA probably can designate broad cate-
gories of nanomaterials. Section 26(c) of
TSCA allows EPA to regulate “categories” of
chemicals as if they were individual chemi-
cals. To date, EPA has shown no inclination
to use the significant new use provisions to
deal with nano.
Most of the discussions of TSCA (and the
other EPA authorities) implicitly assume that
the focus of nano regulation would be on
nanomaterials. However, as noted in my dis-
cussion of adverse effects, if the concern is
risk to health or the environment (and that is
the concern), it may be necessary to focus on
individual products rather than on generic
materials. The risks posed by carbon nan-
otubes in golf clubs may be very different
from the risks that might be posed by carbon
nanotubes in dental amalgam.Worse still, the
risks posed by one brand of nano golf club
may be different from the risks posed by
another brand because, for example, the two
brands mix the nanomaterial with different
other substances. For single-walled carbon
nanotubes (and there are other types of nan-
otubes), there are 20 different structural
types, and their lengths can vary from 5 to
300 nanometers. Four different processes
exist for manufacturing them, five methods
for purifying them, and ten surface coatings
are typically applied. So, there are up to
50,000 different versions of single-walled
carbon nanotubes (Schmidt 2007, p. 18), and
each version may have different chemical,
physical, and biological properties.
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The need to focus on individual products
is a potentially complicating factor of
immense proportions. EPA has the legal
authority to regulate individual products.
Specific provisions of TSCA authorize regu-
lation of “articles,” a term that is not defined
in the Act but presumably can mean individ-
ual products. However, even if the need to
deal with individual products can be legally
encompassed by the existing laws, it can like-
ly never be managed by the resources avail-
able to EPA. A combination of better scien-
tific understanding and legal ingenuity will
be required to deal with this problem.
Adequacy of EPA Programs 
to Deal with Nano
Having the legal authority to cover nano is
not the same as providing adequate protec-
tion for the public. As noted above, the pro-
gram needs sufficient authority and technical
capability to perform certain necessary func-
tions. It must also have the resources and
political will to implement those functions.
This section deals with the legal and techni-
cal capability of EPA programs. The follow-
ing two sections deal with resources and
political will.
To provide adequate nano oversight, an
EPA program must be able to do the follow-
ing: get the information necessary to deter-
mine whether a material or product is safe;
promulgate restrictions on the product or, in
the case of media programs, establish stan-
dards for the pollutant; and monitor and
enforce the restrictions. Table 2.1 shows the
degree of legal adequacy of EPA’s product
programs for these functions.
As the table shows, TSCA is particularly
deficient in a number of the functions. The
Act makes it difficult to get information on a
new chemical beyond elementary information
on its chemical properties. To require any
information beyond that which the manufac-
turer chooses to submit, EPA must show
either that the chemical may pose an unrea-
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TABLE 2.1. LEGAL ADEQUACY OF EPA PRODUCT PROGRAMS FOR
NANOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT
Function TSCA FIFRA Fuel Additives 
Requiring toxicity 
and use data
Weak Strong Strong
Placing burden to prove
safety on manufacturer
None Strong Strong
Reviewing safety prior
to marketing
Moderate Strong Strong
Requiring needed 
monitoring
Moderate Moderate Moderate
Requiring timely adverse
event reporting
Strong Moderate Weak
Prohibiting initial 
marketing
Weak Strong Strong
Limiting uses or condi-
tions of use
Weak Strong Weak
Requiring product with-
drawal from market
Weak Strong Moderate
Note: TSCA = Toxic Substances Control Act; FIFRA = Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; Fuel
Additives refer to section 211 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
 
sonable risk or that it will be produced in sub-
stantial quantities and will result in significant
human or environmental exposure. Neither of
these criteria is easy to meet—risk because the
data are unavailable, and substantial quantities
because only rarely are new chemicals initial-
ly produced in large volumes.With respect to
nano, neither the meaning nor the relevance
of “substantial quantities” is clear.
TSCA is equally deficient with respect to
promulgating restrictions.The Act contains a
number of very difficult, perhaps impossible,
requirements that must be met before a
chemical can be regulated. For example, EPA
must show that the proposed regulation is
less burdensome than any alternative and that
the risk could not be sufficiently reduced
under some other law. All the requirements
must be “supported by substantial evidence
in the rulemaking record,” an extraordinarily
high legal hurdle. The courts have already
established that the combination of the diffi-
cult requirements and the high legal hurdle
make it practically impossible to regulate
existing chemicals under TSCA (Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA (947 F. 2d 1201)).
Another important problem with TSCA is
its treatment of confidential business infor-
mation. Manufacturers have tended to label
much of the information they submit to EPA
as trade secrets, thus preventing it from being
made public. The Act (sec. 14(a)) even pro-
hibits EPA from sharing such information
with states or with other nations, regardless of
how well the data would be protected. At
least with respect to regulation, it might be
possible to get the courts to allow EPA some-
what more leeway under TSCA. However,
the Act desperately needs to be amended,
both to deal with nano and to adequately
address all types of chemicals.
EPA has announced a voluntary program
for getting risk information about nanomate-
rials from industry, but has not yet put it into
effect (see 70FR24574, 5/10/05).The pro-
gram is intended to help the agency to know
what data are necessary for determining the
risk of nanomaterials and which materials
should be the focus of its efforts. There
should be an interplay between modifying
the regulations (such as promulgating a sig-
nificant new use rule for nano) and the vol-
untary effort. A sequential approach will
leave nano unregulated for far too long and
will also be less productive than if the two
efforts proceed in tandem.
FIFRA, which regulates pesticides, is
much more stringent than TSCA and clearly
places the burden of proof for establishing
safety on the manufacturer.This makes sense
because pesticides have the unique combina-
tion of being poisonous and being deliber-
ately released into the environment.
FIFRA, unlike TSCA, has the legal
authority to deal adequately with nano,
although it is handicapped by the same lack
of scientific information about nano as all
other programs.A major problem for the pes-
ticide program is how to deal with anti-bac-
terial nanoproducts that are incorporated in
things that are not normally thought of as
pesticides, such as the washing machines that
release silver ions with each load for the pur-
pose of killing bacteria (Kinney 2006).
FIFRA clearly defines a pesticide as anything
intended to destroy or repel a pest (sec.
136(u)(1)), and it explicitly defines “pest” to
include bacteria and viruses (sec. 136 (t)(2)).
Nevertheless, there is something surreal
about asking whether washing machines or
food-storage containers are pesticides, and it
is a type of problem not envisioned by the
drafters of the statute.
EPA needs to craft a category of nanopes-
ticides and decide how to regulate them.This
can probably be done without any new law
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and perhaps even under existing regulations.
It will require close coordination with other
EPA programs because the major environ-
mental impacts of such pesticides are likely to
fall within the jurisdiction of environmental
laws other than FIFRA. For example, in the
washing machine case, the major potential
impact is in water and on wastewater treat-
ment plants.
For a variety of reasons the legal issue of
whether nano versions of already-registered
pesticides require new registration is not a
major problem. In contrast to TSCA, it is clear
that in almost every case a nanopesticide will
be considered “new” and will have to go
through the FIFRA registration process (ABA
2006e). However, EPA probably will need to
make some changes in the data it requires to
be submitted for registration, and perhaps it
will need to modify or add to other regula-
tions to deal with nanopesticides (ibid.).
Both the CWA and the CAA suffer from
a fundamental problem in dealing with
nano: there are no good methods for moni-
toring nanoparticles in air or water. The
monitoring problem is double-edged. First,
to collect and analyze samples, there is a
need for machines or devices that are both
affordable and easily usable in the setting of
a factory or a water monitoring station.
Second, the scientific basis for knowing
what to monitor is not yet available. The
second problem may prove more difficult
than the first. Monitoring the number or
weight of nanoparticles will not help much
if their surface area, shape, electrical con-
ductivity or other characteristics are the pri-
mary determinants of their toxicity.
Another fundamental problem for both
Acts is the paucity of control methods.As the
ABA (2006c, p. 4) paper on the CWA states,
“Very little is known about the availability of
technology to control nanoparticles in waste-
water streams.”The ABA (2006a, p. 15) paper
on the CAA concludes that “it is clear that air
pollution control technologies exist upon
which EPA can rely in implementing specific
air emission standards,”but most of these tech-
nologies have not been tried on nanoparticles
in realistic settings.
At this point in time, so little is known
about how to monitor and control nanopar-
ticles in water that it is not useful to talk
about changes in the CWA that might be
needed to deal with nano.The one possibil-
ity for action under the Act is that writers of
water pollution control permits might spec-
ify some kind of “best management prac-
tices” for individual facilities (e.g., handle
nanomaterials only in airtight enclosures) as
a non-quantitative way of dealing with nano
(ABA 2006c, p. 11).There is a lot of flexibil-
ity in the CWA permitting system (Davies
2001), so this could probably be done with-
out changes in the Act.
Under the CAA, EPA regulates fine par-
ticulates as a criteria air pollutant. Although
the particulates currently regulated are gen-
erally larger than nano-size (they can be up
to 2,500 nanometers), in theory nanoparti-
cles could be regulated as part of this catego-
ry (ABA 2006a, p.12). This would have the
advantage of fitting nanoparticles into the
overall current approach to air pollution con-
trol. However, the fit might not be comfort-
able because of the differences, with respect
to monitoring and controls, between
nanoparticles and the fine particles currently
regulated. Also, EPA would have to establish
that the nanoparticles being regulated pose a
risk to human health, a difficult task because
of the dearth of scientific information and
the very wide variety of nanoparticles.
The same problem of proving risk would
apply to an alternative approach, adding
nanoparticles to the list of hazardous air pol-
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lutants. If nanoparticles were officially de-
clared to be hazardous air pollutants, EPA
could prescribe control requirements for cate-
gories of sources emitting nanoparticles. Here
again, however, the fit might not be comfort-
able. Hazardous air pollutants (like criteria
pollutants) are regulated based on mass (ibid.
p.17), a generally inappropriate basis for regu-
lating nanoparticles.
The CAA’s fuel-additives provisions are
intermediate between TSCA and FIFRA.
They give the agency ample authority to
obtain safety information from the manufac-
turer, but they limit the agency’s actions to
approving or disapproving the additive. As
discussed below, a nano fuel additive is cur-
rently being evaluated by EPA under the fuel
additive provisions of the CAA. It is likely
that there will be additional nano additives
that come under these provisions.
EPA authorities under RCRA and CER-
CLA are broad enough to cover nanomateri-
als, as noted above.Application of both acts is
handicapped by the lack of monitoring and
control techniques for nano.To the extent that
nanomaterials are different from larger materi-
als in terms of toxic action or transport in the
environment, procedures under RCRA and
CERCLA “may inappropriately over- or
under-predict environmental risks” (ABA
2006f, p. 10). Major adjustments will be nec-
essary in the RCRA requirements for haz-
ardous-waste generators because the require-
ments vary based on the amount of hazardous
waste they generate (often measured in tens or
hundreds of tons), and “amount” may not be a
useful criterion for nanomaterials.
For both RCRA and CERCLA, the ABA
conclusion about CERCLA (ABA 2006b, p.
13) is applicable: “The current state of
knowledge concerning the environmental
and health effects of nanomaterials poses
practical difficulties. . . It is probably correct
to say that most of the scientific and techni-
cal predicates for applying the statute to
nanomaterials do not yet exist.”
Resources to Deal with Nano
Resources are a major constraint for all fed-
eral regulatory agencies. For most of the
agencies, e.g., the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), it is clear that there is insufficient
money and people to take on additional
tasks, such as regulating nano, without sacri-
ficing some other essential task (see Taylor
2006; Davies 2006). With EPA, the resource
constraints are severe but less clear-cut.
EPA’s budget is by far the largest of any of
the regulatory agencies (Eisner 2006, p. 32).A
significant proportion of the budget (varying
from year to year) goes for grants to state
environmental agencies, to researchers, and
for construction. The fiscal year (FY) 2008
budget requests $7.2 billion in budget
authority for EPA. This is an approximately
10% reduction from three years earlier, not
adjusting for inflation.Adjusting for inflation,
the EPA budget is less now than it was in
1973 (see Eisner 2006, p. 33). The agency’s
responsibilities have continued to expand as
the economy has grown and as new authori-
ties and programs have been added to its
portfolio. The gap between resources and
responsibilities has widened considerably
over the past 25 years.
The actual width of the gap is hard to
measure. Where numerical workload meas-
ures are available, for example, issuing air and
water permits, EPA is not able to keep up
with the workload (see Davies 2001).
However, the balkanized, fragmented nature
of the agency (often reinforced by congres-
sional allegiances to particular programs)
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makes it hard to shift resources from one
program to another, so it is often unclear
whether the problem is a lack of resources or
a failure to change priorities.The perception
within the agency is that resources are inad-
equate and that important and needed activ-
ities remain undone because the resources
are not available to do them.
Funding for nano in EPA is concentrated in
the Office of Research and Development
(ORD) and the Office of Pollution Prevention
and Toxics (OPPT). According to the NNI,
EPA’s nano budget was $7 million in FY 2005.
This dropped to $5 million in FY 2006, but
increased to $9 million in FY 2007. The FY
2008 budget requests $10 million (National
Nanotechnology Initiative 2006, p. 35; 2008
figure from www.ostp.gov accessed 2/3/07).
The major part of the EPA money (about
80%) is for ORD. According to NNI, EPA
spent $4 million for nano risk research in FY
2006. For all government agencies in FY
2006, the NNI estimates nano risk-related
expenditures to be $38.5 million. PEN esti-
mates that total nano risk expenditures in cal-
endar year 2005 were only $30.6 million and
that highly relevant risk research amounted to
only $10.8 million.There is broad agreement
outside of the government that federal expen-
ditures on nano risks should be significantly
increased (see Nordan 2006).
Research funding for nano is, at least in
theory, coordinated by the NNI.However, the
nature of NNI’s coordinating function is not
altogether clear. It has no authority to transfer
money from one agency to another, and it is
difficult to know how much influence it has
had on the allocation of funds within any of
the participating agencies. It can be argued
that NNI is less a coordinating mechanism
than a fund-raising device that raises the visi-
bility of nano research and development
(R&D) to Congress and the public.
The National Research Council (NRC)
(2006) has conducted two reviews of the
NNI.The 2006 review concluded that “NNI
is successfully coordinating nanoscale R&D
efforts and interests across the federal govern-
ment; catalyzing cooperative research and
technology development across a spectrum of
disciplines . . . and opening a host of new
opportunities for scientific discoveries at the
nanoscale . . . ” (NRC 2006, summary p. 3). It
found that NNI is “greater than the sum of its
parts” and “is successfully establishing R&D
programs with wider impact than could have
been expected from separate agency funding
without coordination”(ibid. p. 4). It credits
NNI with influencing agency budgets and
programs, citing “the FY 2005 refocusing of
the Environmental Protection Agency’s nan-
otechnology resources on studies of the toxi-
city of nanomaterials” (ibid. p. 3).The NRC
also recommended that research on the envi-
ronmental, health, and safety effects of nan-
otechnology should be expanded (ibid. p. 8).
NNI currently lacks any metrics or indica-
tors by which to evaluate its accomplish-
ments. The broad scope of NNI’s mission
makes metrics difficult, but there are models
and precedents that show the task to be
doable. The Commerce Department’s Ad-
vanced Technology program rates the per-
formance of the technologies it supports
(Science 2006), and the NRC has done a study
of metrics for the Climate Change Science
Program (NRC 2005).The NRC (2006, Ch.
2) already has made a start in developing indi-
cators for the NNI. NNI should be able to
measure its progress.
The non-research spending for nano in
EPA is concentrated in OPPT.The OPPT FY
2007 budget is around $93 million. How
much of this is devoted to nano is unknown,
in part because OPPT employees who spend
a portion of their time on nano work on
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other things (e.g., non-nano new chemical
notices) as well. It is safe to say that only a
very small percentage (less than 5% and prob-
ably less than 1%) of the OPPT budget is
spent on nano.
If we look at people instead of dollars, the
FY 2007 budget requests 17,560 full-time
equivalent (FTE) employees for all of EPA.
This is about 400 fewer than the agency had
10 years ago (EPA 2006). In FY 2006, OPPT
had a total of 382 FTEs, which was not
enough to adequately perform the chemical
reviews required by TSCA. No estimates are
available for what portion of OPPT employ-
ee time is spent on nano, but my estimate is
that it is five or six FTEs at most.
Another relevant and very scarce resource
is people with expertise in nano. It does not
take a Ph.D. economist to figure out that nano
experts can earn more money in the private
sector than in government. How many people
with nano expertise have had the dedication
to public service to go to work for the gov-
ernment is not known, but it is a very small
number. Many, perhaps most, of the EPA
employees dealing with nano have had little or
no prior experience with the subject.
How much additional funding would EPA
need to adequately oversee nano? The answer
depends on how the agency will go about the
task and on how much of the research on
nano’s effects will be done by EPA. Also, the
amount will change over time. A rough esti-
mate for the next couple of fiscal years is $50
million each year—about half to EPA’s ORD,
and the other half equally divided between
OPPT and the other EPA programs. This
would bring EPA nano research up to an ade-
quate level, given the constraint of finding
qualified researchers. It would provide fund-
ing for OPPT to review new nanomaterials
and staff the voluntary program, and it would
give the other EPA programs the resources
necessary to begin considering what actions
they should take to deal with nano.
Political Will to Address Nano Effects
Addressing nano effects requires political
will. If there is enough political support, legal
and resource problems can be overcome.
Even the scientific and technical problems
are likely to yield to a sufficient investment of
research funding.
Currently the political climate generally
favors free-market laissez-faire over any form
of government action.This has been true for
the past 30 years, and it accounts for the
dearth of resources in EPA and other regula-
tory agencies. The anti-regulatory climate
has been supported by both Congress and
the executive branch at the federal level and
also by many of the states. It has been
opposed by environmental and consumer
groups, but these groups lack the power to
do much except defend the laws that are
already on the books.
With respect to nano, the current situa-
tion, at least at the federal level, may be char-
acterized as the Pangloss Gap. Pangloss was
the character in Voltaire’s Candide whose
refrain was “All is for the best in the best of
all possible worlds.”The current administra-
tion has repeatedly stated that no new legis-
lation is necessary, that all existing regulato-
ry programs are well suited to deal with
nano, and that research priorities and fund-
ing are just what they should be. In short, all
is for the best in the best of all possible
worlds. The reality is that the public is not
being adequately protected from nano prod-
ucts and materials whose effects on health
and the environment are unknown. This is
the Pangloss Gap.
Industry is the swing factor politically, and
reading its political position is hard because
there are multiple nano industries, not one.
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Nano affects almost every economic sector,
and firms working on nano range from two-
person start-up companies to giants such as
General Electric, IBM, and DuPont.There is
no single industry group for nano.
The NanoBusiness Alliance represents
primarily the smaller companies whose sole
or primary business is nanomaterials or prod-
ucts.The Alliance has opposed any addition-
al regulation of nano and has generally sup-
ported the Republican administration’s
Panglossian position. However, it has sup-
ported increased funding for research on
nano health and environmental effects. The
large chemical companies working on nano
are represented by the American Chemistry
Council, which has been more sympathetic
to regulation, although it has also opposed
any new laws aimed specifically at nano.
DuPont has cooperated with the environ-
mental group Environmental Defense to
develop a framework for managing the risks
of nanomaterials (see Chapter III).
The underlying choice that nano compa-
nies face is whether government regulation
will impede or even strangle innovation and
growth of nano, or whether a lack of regula-
tion will have the same result. There is evi-
dence that some large companies (e.g., Kraft
Foods [see Feder 2006]) and some venture
capitalists have limited their involvement
with nano because of the lack of any clear
guidelines about what will be regulated and
how. Public opinion polls show that the
absence of government regulation could lead
to public skepticism about the new technol-
ogy (Macoubrie 2005; Hart 2006).
Mustering the political will to adequately
manage nano will depend heavily on three
factors. One is the attitude of the businesses
engaged in nano. How many will perceive
regulation as an asset and how many will per-
ceive it as the opposite?
A second factor is change in the politi-
cal climate. These are volatile political
times, and it is hard to predict when,
whether, and how the laissez-faire climate
might change. Greater awareness of the
debilitated condition of the federal regula-
tory agencies could contribute to a change.
Most of the American people are still under
the illusion that they are being adequately
protected by EPA, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA), the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC), and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA).
The third factor is the occurrence of an
accident or some other agenda-forcing event.
It is unfortunate but true that most regulato-
ry legislation has been a response to some
dramatic adverse event—poisoning from
contaminated food, the Santa Barbara oil
spill, Love Canal. People being injured by use
of a nanoproduct or a massive fish kill caused
by nano could dramatically change the cli-
mate for regulating nano. I very much hope
that such an event will not occur.
EPA Experience Regulating Nano
Thus far, EPA has had limited experience
dealing with nanomaterials or nanoprod-
ucts. Three statutes have been involved:
TSCA, CAA, and FIFRA.
TSCA is the major law that EPA has
used to address nanomaterials. A manufac-
turer is required to submit a pre-manufac-
turing notice (PMN) to EPA before it can
manufacture a new chemical. How many
new chemical notices EPA has received for
nanomaterials are uncertain because manu-
facturers are not required to identify a
material as being nanoscale. An agency
source estimated that between January 2005
and October 2006 around 20 PMNs for
nanomaterials had been received.
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A search of the Federal Register (FR)
between January 2004 and October 2006
identified only five nano PMNs. Altair
Nanomaterials Inc. submitted PMNs for
three chemicals: lanthanum carbonate oxide
to be used for water treatment (FR 7/11/05);
lanthanum for the removal of ionic phosphate
from recreational water (FR 12/9/05); and
lithium titanium oxide used as an anode for a
lithium-ion battery (FR 1/18/06). An
unidentified company submitted a PMN for
siloxane-coated alumina nanoparticles in
2005 (FR 8/10/05) and began manufacture
of the material in 2006 (FR 8/14/06), and
another unidentified company began manu-
facture of siloxane coated silica nanoparticles
in 2006 (FR 6/9/06).
A company making a sixth nanomaterial,
a carbon nanotube, applied for a low-volume
exemption from the TSCA requirements.
The agency decided to grant an exemption
but under a different regulation, the Low
Release and Exposure Exemption (LoREX).
The terms of the LoREX exemption require
that the chemical will yield no exposures to
the general public, no releases to air or water,
and that all worker exposure will be ade-
quately controlled (communication from
EPA 11/3/06). Also, the company agreed to
allow EPA to re-review the chemical in the
future (Phibbs 2005).
Under questioning from a reporter, EPA
revealed that in 2005 it reviewed 15 new
nanoscale chemicals and found that only
one—the carbon nanotube given the
LoREX exemption—had “unique proper-
ties that would cause it to act differently than
a larger form of the same chemical would be
expected to act” (Rizzuto 2006a). The
agency decided that the other 14 were not
covered by the new chemicals provisions of
TSCA. EPA did not reveal how it defined
“unique properties” and did not indicate
what evidence, if any, it used to reach its
conclusion.
The EPA decision to classify most of the
nanoscale chemicals it reviewed as existing
chemicals and thus not subject to regulation
under the TSCA new chemicals provisions
relates to a category of nanoparticles that the
ASTM (2006) has labeled “non-transitive
nanoparticles.” The ASTM defines these
nanoparticles as ones that behave the same as
larger versions of the material. However, there
is an ambiguity about what the word same
means in the definition. EPA seems to have
decided that if a nanoparticle is chemically
and physically the same as the comparable
material in bulk form, it should not be
reviewed as a new chemical under TSCA.The
fact that the chemical at nano size might be
biologically and ecologically different from
the bulk chemical appears not to have entered
the agency’s decision process.We do not know
the extent to which size alone creates a poten-
tial for harm. For instance, if size allows parti-
cles to penetrate cells or reach body organs
that larger particles cannot, even non-transi-
tive nanoparticles could present new potential
health and environmental challenges. EPA’s
pattern of decisions with respect to new
nanoscale chemicals has far-reaching implica-
tions. If the agency continues to follow the
pattern, then large numbers of nanoparticles,
perhaps the majority, can be marketed without
any government review of their safety.
EPA’s TSCA office is planning to initiate a
voluntary stewardship program for nanoma-
terials, but the program will not start until
mid-2007 at the earliest (see Chapter III).
EPA is years away from having an adequate
nano program under TSCA.
In October 2005, the director of EPA’s
Office of Pesticide Programs stated,“We’re not
aware of any companies who have come to us
with nano pesticides” (U.S. EPA 2005a). In
31EPA and Nanotechnology: Oversight for the 21st Century
January 2006, the Pesticides Office was asked
to register as pesticides washing machines
being sold by Samsung.
The washing machines in question,
Samsung’s “Silver Wash” clothing-washing
machines, release nano silver particles into
each load of wash. (Technically, the machines
release ions, not particles, but the difference is
not significant in this context.) Silver is a
known bactericide, and the silver is intended
to sanitize each wash load.The request that the
machines be registered as pesticides came from
Tri-TAC, a technical advisory group for
wastewater treatment plants in California (see
www.tritac.org).Tri-TAC noted that,“Silver
is highly toxic to aquatic life at low concentra-
tions,” that it “bioaccumulates in some aquatic
organisms such as clams,” and that it “cannot
degrade” (letter Chuck Weir to Jim Jones,
1/27/06, available at www.tritac.org).
Initially EPA decided that the washing
machines were “devices” and not pesticides.
In November 2006, it reversed itself and said
it would regulate the machines as pesticides
(Daily Environment Report, 11/21/06).
However, a number of other consumer prod-
ucts also use silver nanoparticles as deodor-
ants, disinfectants, or fungicides. Tri-TAC
mentioned this in its initial letter, and the
Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) wrote EPA requesting that it
examine the “more than 40 consumer prod-
ucts . . . that contain nanosilver” and require
that any of them that use nanosilver as a bio-
cide apply for registration as a pesticide (let-
ter Jennifer Sass and Mae C.Wu, NRDC, to
Jim Jones, 11/22/06). EPA has not said what
it will do about these other products, nor is
it clear how it will act in relation to the
Samsung washing machines. Meanwhile,
nano-based disinfectants have been applied
to all handle surfaces in the Hong Kong
metro rail system’s trains and stations, and
London is considering doing the same (Land
2006). Millions of people are being exposed
to the types of nanomaterials that potential-
ly should be registered under FIFRA.
Aside from the pesticidal washing
machines, the most controversial nano regu-
latory decision now on EPA’s plate is the reg-
istration of a fuel additive under the CAA.
Envirox™ Fuel Borne Catalyst, manufac-
tured by Oxonica, contains cerium oxide
nanoparticles. It is already used in fuel in
Europe. One British transportation company,
Stagecoach Group, now uses the nano addi-
tive in its entire fleet of 7,000 buses (Small
Times 2005). Oxonica has applied to EPA for
permission to sell the additive in the United
States.The company claims that the additive
improves fuel consumption and reduces
diesel vehicle emissions.A decision is expect-
ed in summer 2007.
What I have described in this section is
the entire experience that EPA has reported
to date with regulating nano. One would
not guess, based on this experience, that
nano is a major new technology being com-
mercialized at a very rapid pace. Lux
Research (2006, p. iii) estimates that, by
2014, 15% of all goods manufactured glob-
ally will involve nanotechnology. What the
EPA record reflects is not the pace at which
nano is being developed, marketed, and
adopted. Rather, it reflects the rapidly
widening gap between the adoption of the
technology in the private sector and the
government’s lagging attempts to under-
stand nano and to ensure that it does not
harm humans and the environment.
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Several decades of experience regulating envi-
ronmental problems have resulted in a variety
of different approaches and a good deal of
information about the effectiveness of differ-
ent regulatory tools.The tools have been rea-
sonably effective at eliminating the types of
pollution problems that sparked the environ-
mental movement, but there is broad agree-
ment that existing regulatory approaches need
revision and that the new problems of the 21st
century, such as nano, require new tools.3
Nano presents particular challenges to the
existing system. It is neither a bulk pollutant
nor a chemical in the sense that these were
defined as the objects of regulation of most
existing environmental laws.We are not sure
what characteristics of nanomaterials deter-
mine their toxicity; nano materials and prod-
ucts likely follow new exposure pathways in
both the human body and the environment;
and, in the future, some nanomaterials may
be self-replicating.
The old models of regulation are also ques-
tionable. They assumed that resources would
be adequate, that the pace of innovation
would be relatively slow,and that key decisions
would be based primarily on the risks of indi-
vidual materials. Adequate resources are still
necessary, but the gap between what is ade-
quate and what is available has become so
wide that priority setting has become perhaps
the most fundamental decision.The slow pace
of innovation is also a thing of the past. The
risks of individual materials are still critical, but
more-general questions relating to such issues
as the power of government, the distribution
of wealth, and ethical and cultural norms have
come to be an important part of decision-
making about new technologies.
In this chapter, I review available tools, dis-
cuss their applicability to nano, and provide
some indication of which tools may be most
effective. I also suggest some directions that
new forms of regulation could take. I discuss
information tools, voluntary efforts, econom-
ic tools, and liability. I also consider the role of
state and local governments, and the impor-
tance of public participation in implementing
any effort to deal with nano’s effects.
Adjusting Existing Programs
Before talking about tools, I should acknowl-
edge the advantages of the EPA regulatory
systems that are in place.The fact that they are
in place is, in itself, a major advantage. The
American political system is designed to
obstruct new initiatives. New laws are difficult
and time-consuming to enact, and even new
regulations typically take years to promulgate
if they are of any significant magnitude.Thus,
there is a great incentive to work with the laws
and regulations that are in place.
The other notable advantage of the EPA
regulatory systems is their comprehensive-
ness. In one sense, the EPA laws are highly
fragmented, and I will discuss this in Chapter
IV. But during the past 35 years, Congress has
enacted a large number of environmental
laws, and it is hard to find any part of the
environment, or any type of environmental
problem, that has not been addressed, at least
partially or indirectly.Thus, it is not surpris-
ing, as discussed in Chapter II, that there are
many EPA laws and regulations that may
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apply to nano. In that chapter, I briefly dis-
cussed how existing regulatory programs can
be adjusted to manage the new technology. In
this chapter, I discuss various other kinds of
tools to deal with nano.
Information Tools
Public shame always has been used as a way to
discourage bad behavior. Two programs pio-
neered the contemporary use of information
as a regulatory or oversight tool. In 1986, the
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act initiated the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI). The inventory
requires companies releasing more than a cer-
tain amount of any of several hundred toxic
chemicals to report the releases to EPA annu-
ally. EPA then publishes the figures with 
the name and location of the company and
the amount of pollutants the company
released (see www.epa.gov/triexplorer/;
also www.scorecard. org).
At about the same time that EPA was
developing TRI, voters in the State of
California approved a ballot initiative,
Proposition 65. Under Prop 65, the state
annually publishes a list of chemicals known
to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity
(www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65). If a compa-
ny exposes individuals to any of these chem-
icals (or to levels of the chemical that exceed
a safe level if such a level has been established)
it must provide a warning, usually by labeling
the product.
Both TRI and Prop 65 generally have
been viewed as successful. According to Dan
Fiorino (2006, p. 49),TRI has “pushed many
companies to significantly reduce their envi-
ronmental impacts” (also see Herb et al. in
Dietz and Stern 2002). However, some argue
that almost all the TRI reductions are attrib-
utable to other regulatory requirements.Weil
et al. (2006, p. 172), after reviewing the liter-
ature, conclude that TRI’s effectiveness in
reducing toxic pollution “remains uncertain.”
Prop 65 has resulted in many companies
removing toxic materials, such as lead, from
their products so that they would not have to
affix a warning label (Percival et al. 2003, pp.
130–131; also Rechtschaffen 1999).
Could a disclosure-based scheme be
applied to nano? There have been proposals
that consumer products containing nanoma-
terials be labeled (see, for example, Lin 2006).
Some kinds of nanoproducts would have to
be labeled now. For example, labeling is the
core of the pesticide regulatory program, and
if nano-containing pesticides were registered
by EPA, they would have to have a label con-
taining information approved by the govern-
ment. However, the label information would
not necessarily have to include the fact that
the pesticide contained nanomaterials.
There is an extensive literature on the
effectiveness of different labeling approaches
(see Thogersen in Dietz and Stern 2002).
However, a peculiarity of labeling nanoprod-
ucts is that for some people the nano label
would be a plus and for others it would be a
negative. Consumers seeing the nano label
might think “modern, futuristic, fashionable,
effective” or they might think “new, untried,
dangerous.” For most other labels this kind of
ambiguity does not exist. Public views on
nano are still largely unformed (Macoubrie
2005; Hart 2006), so the ambiguity could
change in the future.
A disclosure-based approach to managing
nano could be relatively simple. Both nano-
materials and nanoproducts would be required
to be labeled.The label would be required to
contain two pieces of information: (1) the fact
that it is a nanomaterial or nanoproduct; and
(2) a telephone number and e-mail address
where adverse effects could be reported. A
government agency (which agency would dif-
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fer depending on the product) would be
empowered to recall, ban, or limit products
suspected of causing adverse effects.
This approach is not quite as simple as it
might seem. Relevant questions that would
have to be answered include how to define
nano materials and products, who receives
and validates the adverse effects notices, and
what kind of powers should be given to the
government agency.
An alternative approach would be a vari-
ant of the Prop 65 model. EPA and/or other
federal agencies could promulgate a set of
testing requirements appropriate to deter-
mine the safety of various kinds of nano con-
sumer products. Manufacturers of covered
products that had not conducted the tests
would be required to affix a label to the
product stating that the product contained
nanomaterial and had not been tested for
safety. The assumption is that such a label
would discourage sales and thus be an incen-
tive to companies to do testing.
This approach is also not without difficul-
ties.At present, it is not clear that the science
is adequate to promulgate testing require-
ments. Even if it were, it would be necessary
to adjust the tests to different types of prod-
ucts and to determine the extent to which
manufacturers could rely on testing done by
others. Enforcement would not be simple—
government agencies would have to be able
to ask manufacturers for their test results and
this in turn raises questions about what to do
about tests that show that a product is unsafe.
Simplicity is not likely to be characteristic
of any oversight scheme for nano.The diver-
sity of nano products and applications is, by
itself, a major complicating factor. It is diffi-
cult to structure effective disclosure policies
in any case (Weil et al. 2006). Disclosure and
information approaches are not likely to be a
complete answer for managing nano, but
they may be important supplements to other
approaches.
Voluntary Efforts: Industry Initiated
A variety of programs and experiments loose-
ly termed “voluntary” have been initiated over
the past 15 years. Some are more voluntary
than others, and all of them function within
the context of a dense web of non-voluntary
government regulations.They share a premise
that government regulation has become overly
cumbersome and inflexible, and that non-reg-
ulatory initiatives can supplement or provide
alternatives to regulation that are both more
efficient and more effective.
Some voluntary initiatives are primarily
initiated by industry and others are primarily
initiated by government.Within the first cat-
egory, I will discuss three general types of
programs: industry codes of practice; envi-
ronmental management systems; and third
party (other than industry and government)
efforts. The categories cannot be neatly
delineated. For example, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), a
third party, promulgated standards for envi-
ronmental management systems, which were
then used as a component of some govern-
ment-initiated voluntary efforts.
Several trade associations for major indus-
tries have established codes of environmental
practice for their industries, although some of
these are no more than loose pledges to be
good corporate citizens. In recent years, some
industries, notably chemicals and pulp and
paper, have placed a lot of emphasis on such
codes, refining their content, utilizing
enforcement mechanisms, and publicizing
their members’ adherence to the code. (see
Nash in Dietz and Stern 2002; Eisner 2006).
The effort most relevant to nano is the
Responsible Care program of the American
Chemistry Council (ACC).The ACC (previ-
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ously called the Chemical Manufacturers
Association) represents large manufacturers
of chemicals. Responsible Care was started in
Canada in the 1970s and in the United States
in 1988. It has undergone many changes
since its inception. ACC is currently imple-
menting a system for third-party certification
of members’ compliance with Responsible
Care (Eisner 2006, pp. 161–162).
Starting in 2005, the environmental organ-
ization Environmental Defense has been
cooperating with the DuPont Company to
develop guidelines for reviewing the safety of
nanomaterials and nanoproducts. A draft of
the guidelines was issued in February 2007.
The guidelines are based on a framework that
includes describing the material and its appli-
cations, profiling its life cycle, evaluating risk
from the material, and assessing and imple-
menting risk management options. The
framework will be demonstrated on some
potential DuPont products. It would be logi-
cal to assume that if this effort is successful, the
results could be incorporated into the
Responsible Care program.
On April 12, 2007, 21 environmental and
labor groups, including the Natural
Resources Defense Council and the AFL-
CIO, issued an open letter criticizing the
Environmental Defense–DuPont framework
as “fundamentally flawed.”The letter did not
name any of the flaws. It rejected the frame-
work on the grounds that the process was
one “in which broad public participation in
government oversight . . . [was] usurped by
industry and its allies” and that the frame-
work might be used “to delay needed regula-
tion and forestall public involvement.” The
letter can be interpreted as a signal that the
signers want the politics of nano to be the
same as the deadlocked politics of environ-
mental policy generally, a polarized standoff
between industry and enviros.
Evidence about the effectiveness of indus-
try codes is fragmentary (see Harrison in
Dietz and Stern 2002), and is complicated by
the variety of different codes and different
industry characteristics. Studies of Respon-
sible Care “suggest that this code—the most
highly developed of all U.S trade association
efforts in environmental self-regulation—has
failed to reliably improve firms’ internal man-
agement practices” (Nash in Dietz and Stern
2002, p. 248; also see Morgenstern and Pizer
2007, p. 7). It has, however, probably im-
proved the environmental practices of the
suppliers, distributors, and customers of
Responsible Care firms (Nash in Dietz and
Stern 2002, p. 249).
The great advantages of industry codes are
that they can be implemented relatively rap-
idly and they can be altered to deal with
changes in technology.Vivian Weil (2006) has
suggested that such codes could contribute
to public trust in a technology if the codes
were developed with public input.
The disadvantages of most industry codes
are their dependence on voluntary industry
conformance, their lack of specific standards,
and the lack of transparency in both their
development and implementation. Also, most
of the major trade associations, such as the
ACC, include only a few small or medium-
size firms. Often it is the smaller firms that
most need codes of good practice. The wide
range of nanotechnology materials, applica-
tions, and products is an additional complicat-
ing factor. Many different trade associations
represent firms that are or could be major
users of nanomaterials, and even manufactur-
ers of nanomaterials are not represented by
any one trade association.As noted in Chapter
II, the ACC and the NanoBusiness Alliance
are the two most important nano trade associ-
ations, but they do not cover many of the
firms that have a stake in nano policy.
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A second category of industry voluntary
efforts centers on environmental manage-
ment systems (EMS). An EMS is a process
within an individual company for identifying
actual and potential environmental problems
and for ensuring that steps are taken to deal
with the problems.
EMSs have been used in a variety of con-
texts and have been the subject of an exten-
sive literature (see, for examples, Coglianese
and Nash 2001; Coglianese and Nash 2006;
Mazurek in Durant et al. 2004). The ABA
paper on innovative regulatory approaches
(2006d, p. 6) suggests the possibility of a
“nanotechnology management system” that,
like an EMS, would serve as the basis of a
voluntary program to manage nano.
However, it does not describe what the con-
tent of such a system might be.
There is some evidence that firms that
have a formal EMS pollute less than firms
that do not have an EMS (Coglianese and
Nash 2006, p. 17). However, cause and effect
are difficult to separate. It may be that firms
that pollute less are better environmental cit-
izens and thus more likely to adopt an EMS.
There are many types of EMSs.Almost all
of them suffer from similar deficiencies,
although it seems elementary for any compa-
ny that has the least environmental sensitivi-
ty (or that wants to avoid breaking the law)
to have some kind of EMS.The deficiencies
include a lack of substantive standards—an
EMS is just a process, it does not deal with
results or outcomes; a lack of transparency—
usually public involvement is not a significant
component of an EMS; and the possibility of
a rigidity and intrusiveness greater than any
existing environmental regulations—if a uni-
form pollution-control technology for an
industry produces major inefficiencies, a uni-
form management system could be even
worse.There is a slippery slope starting from
government using incentives to encourage
companies to have an EMS and ending with
government prescribing the specifics of the
EMS a company should use. If companies
(and economists) do not like government
prescribing technology, it is hard to see why
they would like government prescribing
internal-management systems for a firm.
The ISO 14000 series, which contains a
uniform code for EMS, had a significant
impact in encouraging adoption of EMSs
(see Eisner 2006, pp. 163–175). This shows
how important third-party efforts can be.
ISO is a Geneva-based international non-
governmental organization that serves as a
federation of standards bodies for more than
125 nations. ISO’s Technical Committee 229
is currently working on standards for defin-
ing and measuring nanomaterials and 
on testing methods for nanomaterials
(www.iso.org, accessed 2/14/07).
Another important standards organiza-
tion,ASTM International, is also a voluntary
effort, largely by industry, that is assisting in
nano policy. ASTM is headquartered in the
United States, but it involves technical
experts from more than 100 countries in its
work. ASTM has been cooperating with the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
the Japanese National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and Technology, and sever-
al other organizations to develop consensus
standards for various aspects of nano. In
November 2006, it published 13 definitions
of nano terms (ASTM 2006).The definitions
are somewhat general and leave some key
questions unanswered, but they are a useful
contribution to the discussion about nano.
Voluntary Efforts: 
Government Initiated
Starting from the premise that alternatives to
regulation could be more efficient and effec-
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tive than traditional regulation, EPA has, over
the past 15 years, initiated a variety of volun-
tary efforts (see Mazurek in Dietz and Stern
2002).A 2005 survey identified 87 EPA vol-
untary programs (Morgenstern and Pizer
2007, p. 2). A majority of the programs deal
with energy efficiency and other ways to
address the climate change problem.Ten oth-
ers are focused on pollution prevention.
One—the National Environmental Perfor-
mance Track—is broad in scope and utilizes a
negotiated agreement between EPA and a
private firm to reduce the inflexibilities of
existing regulations.
Several states have also experimented with
voluntary programs. For example,Wisconsin
has a Green Tier Program and New Jersey
had a Silver and Gold Track Program (see
National Academy of Public Administration
2000; Rabe 2004). The state programs are
similar to the EPA programs, dealing prima-
rily with climate change and pollution pre-
vention.The New Jersey program, as well as
some others, was modeled after the Dutch
covenant system, where industry sectors
reach voluntary agreements with the govern-
ment about pollution reductions they will
make (Eisner 2006, pp. 179–184).
There is mixed evidence about the effec-
tiveness of government-initiated voluntary
programs. Mazurek examined three of the
major EPA voluntary programs (Green
Lights, 33/50, and Project XL) and found
that “although the EPA reports that each of
these programs was a success, independent
studies report otherwise” (Mazurek in Dietz
and Stern, p. 225; Morgenstern and Pizer
2007).The programs suffered from a lack of
flexibility because they were bound by exist-
ing legal requirements, from a lack of trans-
parency, and from very cumbersome and
time-consuming decision-making because of
the need to operate by consensus.
In September 2005, EPA announced its
intention to start a voluntary program for
nano (see Davies 2006, p. 22). The program
would ask nano manufacturers to submit to
EPA, for materials chosen by the manufac-
turer, information on (1) material characteri-
zation, (2) hazard data, (3) use and exposure
potential, and (4) risk management practices.
Except for information to describe the mate-
rial, the manufacturers would be asked only
for information they already possess. A sec-
ond program, focusing on a smaller number
of materials, would ask participants to gener-
ate and report enough information to allow
EPA to conduct a full risk assessment. The
primary purpose of the voluntary programs is
to give EPA enough information and expe-
rience to lay the groundwork for a regulato-
ry program under TSCA.
The EPA voluntary nano program has not
yet been started.Originally, it was going to start
in tandem with a similar program initiated by
the British Department for Environment,
Food, and Rural Affairs. The British decided
not to wait for EPA and launched their pro-
gram in September 2006. Initial response to
the British program has been disappointing,
with only six submissions received during the
first six months (see www.defra.gov.uk/
environment/nanotech).
In October 2006, EPA began a series of
consultations with experts and interested par-
ties seeking advice on the questions it should
ask participants in the voluntary program
(Rizzuto 2006b).The agency announced that
it planned to launch the voluntary program
within 10 months. However, several partici-
pants in the first meeting expressed disap-
pointment at what they perceived as EPA’s
lack of readiness to undertake the program,
and they doubted that the agency would be
able to start the program in 10 months. EPA
has had difficulty preparing for the voluntary
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program that is supposed to prepare for a reg-
ulatory program.
Many of the difficulties of the EPA volun-
tary programs stem from the lack of statuto-
ry authorization. Part of the attraction of
these programs was that they did not require
the long, arduous, and politically uncertain
process of getting legislation enacted.
However, pollution-control programs in the
United States always have been driven by
statutory mandates, so the voluntary pro-
grams have not been able to get the atten-
tion, resources, or flexibility that the law-
based EPA programs have.
It would be possible to have a hybrid vol-
untary and regulatory program. This could
take many forms, but basically firms would
be exempted from a traditional regulatory
program if they participated in some type of
approved voluntary program. Any such
arrangement would require safeguards. As
Marc Allen Eisner (2006, p. 5) has observed,
“It may be necessary to delegate greater
authority to corporations, which possess the
greatest knowledge about their technologies,
products, and markets, and to create incen-
tives for innovations in pollution control and
prevention. This, in turn, raises important
questions regarding the monitoring of cor-
porate compliance and the maintenance of
some semblance of public accountability.
Without some means of forcing accountabil-
ity, ‘reform’ may be little more than an abdi-
cation of regulatory responsibility.”
Economic Tools
The free market, in and of itself, does little to
protect the public from potential adverse
effects of nanoproducts. Supplemented by
tools such as labeling and liability, the market
may be able to help prevent the kinds of
acute problems that are both readily identifi-
able and traceable to a particular product.
In recent years, policy makers, prodded by
economic theory, have used some market-
like mechanisms to supplement environmen-
tal regulation and to make it more efficient.
These mechanisms include taxes on pollu-
tion and cap-and-trade systems that allow
buying and selling of pollution rights.These
mechanisms are not appropriate for nano
because they are designed to curb things that
are “bad” whereas nano, in general, is a
“good” that should be encouraged.
There are a few ways in which using tax-
like mechanisms for nano could be consid-
ered. If the relative safety of different
nanoproducts could be determined, in theo-
ry one could tax the less safe ones as a way of
encouraging safer products. However, in the-
ory one would want to prevent the adverse
effects, not just discourage them, and in prac-
tice it is very unlikely that EPA or any other
entity will be able to rate the relative overall
safety of different products.
A more feasible variant of this approach
would be for EPA to collect a fee from the
manufacturer for reviewing nanoproducts for
their effects.The fee could be set so as to pro-
vide an incentive for testing. The fee would
be slightly above the estimated cost for doing
the testing necessary to determine the safety
of the product. For each test result reported
by the manufacturer, the fee would be
reduced by the cost of that test. If all neces-
sary tests were conducted, there would be no
fee or only a minimal fee.
The FDA charges fees for reviewing
drugs. This potentially puts new drugs at a
disadvantage if they are competing against
generic drugs whose makers did not have to
pay a fee, but this is not a common scenario.
In contrast, many nano manufacturers may
be competing with producers of non-
nanoproducts, and they would be economi-
cally disadvantaged by a fee. Whether com-
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petitiveness considerations would be signifi-
cant would depend on the size of the fee and
other factors. In any case, user fees may be an
important component in the future funding
of regulatory agencies.
Subsidies are the other major economic
policy tool.The 25 agencies, including EPA,
that comprise the NNI are spending almost
$1.4 billion on nano in FY 2007, and nearly
$1.5 billion has been proposed for FY 2008
(www.nano.gov). See Table 3.1 for a com-
parison of NNI budgets for 2001 and 2008.
The spending is the total from the budgets of
individual participating agencies: NNI is a
coordinating group that does not have a
budget of its own. Not all of the $1.4 billion
could be called a subsidy, but most of it is
intended to assist the private sector in devel-
oping and utilizing nano. As discussed in
Chapter II, only $38.5 million, or less than
3%, is being spent on the risks of nano.
Liability Tools
In the days before environmental laws exist-
ed, the only tool available to curb pollution
was tort law (and related nuisance law)—
going to court and suing a polluter for dam-
age he had caused you.The successful use of
this tool required two things: proof that you
had been damaged or injured in some way
and proof that the party being sued caused
the damage. In the modern context, neither
of these requirements is likely to be met by
an individual.
Interest in tort law was revived in 1980 by
passage of CERCLA, also known as the
Superfund law. CERCLA (section 107) used
liability as a way of collecting funds for
cleanup of hazardous waste spills and sites. It
circumvented the traditional requirements of
tort law by making any person connected in
any way with the hazardous waste responsi-
ble for all cleanup costs. “Strict, retroactive,
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TABLE 3.1. COMPARISON OF NNI BUDGETS BY AGENCY (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Agency 2001 Actual 2008 Proposed
NSF 150 390
Defense 125 375
Energya 88 332
Health and Human Servicesb 40 208
Commerce (National Institute of Standards and Technology) 33 97
NASA 22 24
EPA 5 10
USDAc 0 8
Homeland Security 0 1
Justice 1 1
Transportation 0 1
Total 464 1,447
a Includes the Department of Energy Offices of Science and Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.
b Includes the National Institutes of Health and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
c Includes the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service and Forest Service.
 
and joint and several liability” is the legal
term applied to this aspect of CERCLA.
Traditional tort law might work to deal
with some short-term acute effects of nano;
however, for the reasons discussed at the
beginning of Chapter II, it is not a useful tool
for dealing with other, more-likely nano
problems. We know from experience with
other technologies that problems will often
go undetected because they occur many
years after exposure to the material (e.g., can-
cer or groundwater contamination) or
because the problems are widespread and
caused by many different factors (e.g., heart
attacks or air pollution). Even if a problem is
detected, being able to prove that it is caused
by a specific product or manufacturer may be
impossible. Most important, liability, even
when it works, is after the fact. Only after
damage has occurred can you go to court. It
may have some preventive effect, but to rely
on it is an unacceptably large gamble with
the health of people and the environment
and can be incredibly costly for businesses
and governments.
A CERCLA-like fix for liability for nano
seems unworkable, in part for the same rea-
sons that a tax on nano would be unworkable
and undesirable. Unlike hazardous waste,
nano is not intrinsically harmful: it is and will
be found in a large variety of desirable prod-
ucts. Nanomaterial resulting from the dis-
carding of products, if it has been shown to
be harmful, can be treated like other wastes
under existing laws, including CERCLA.
State and Local Governments
Placing responsibility for a problem on state
or local government has been a basic element
of environmental programs. Devolution,
decentralization, delegation—giving states
more responsibility and the federal govern-
ment less—has been advocated by reformers
from all parts of the political spectrum. It is
not a tool in the same sense as economic or
information tools, but involving states and
localities could be an element in an oversight
system for nano.
More than a dozen states have active nan-
otechnology programs. However, these pro-
grams are essentially part of each state’s eco-
nomic development strategy, and they do not
devote any attention to the potential adverse
effects of nano. New companies might not be
encouraged to settle in a state that is looking
at the harm that nano might do.
There is one potential exception to states’
ignoring nano adverse effects. In March 2007,
the California Department of Toxic Substances
Control held a half-day symposium on the
potential risks of nano (see www.dtsc.ca.gov
/technologydevelopment/nanotechnolo-
gy.cfm), and the Department has been dis-
cussing the subject with EPA’s Region Nine.
Whether any action will come from this activ-
ity is not clear.
There are two ways that state or local gov-
ernments might become active in regulating
nano. The first is the climate change model.
The complete inability (or, more precisely,
unwillingness) of the federal government to
deal with climate change has led a number of
states to take action to limit greenhouse gas
emissions within the state (Rabe 2004).This is
happening because of four factors: (1) state
officials perceive the problem to be important;
(2) the federal government is not addressing
the problem; (3) the states have expertise and
experience in utility regulation, solid waste
disposal, traffic management, and other func-
tions that can contribute to reduced emis-
sions; and (4) reducing emissions can be done
in ways that make a positive contribution to
state goals and the state economy.These fac-
tors, especially the last two, do not apply to
nano at this time.
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The other model is a law enacted by the
city of Berkeley, California, early in 2007.
Berkeley amended its hazardous materials dis-
closure law to include nanoparticles. It
requires that,“All facilities that manufacture or
use manufactured nanoparticles shall submit a
separate written disclosure of the current tox-
icology of the materials reported, to the extent
known, and how the facility will safely handle,
monitor, contain, dispose, track inventory, pre-
vent releases and mitigate such materials”
(www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/bmc/Berkeley
MunicipalCode/Title15/12/index.html).
Berkeley is not a typical American city. Its
economic base is a large university, and its pol-
itics are quite left of center.To my knowledge,
only one other community—Cambridge,
Massachusetts—is considering regulating nano
(Bray 2007). Cambridge is very much like
Berkeley. Both cities have a heightened aware-
ness of environmental problems and of techno-
logical “threats,” and in both communities the
economic base, large universities, is not likely
to be threatened by any action taken by the
city government.
There is really nothing about nano that
lends itself to localized solutions. Its manu-
facture tends to be international, its markets
are national or international, and its potential
threats are not, for the most part, localized.
TSCA, the federal law that is the center of
EPA’s effort to deal with nano, is the most
pre-emptive law that EPA administers. EPA is
not allowed to share any TSCA confidential
business information with state or local gov-
ernments (TSCA section 14), and a large part
of the information collected under TSCA is
claimed to be confidential.
If my analysis is wrong, and regulation of
nano is enacted or proposed in a number of
states or localities, then it could create a
political climate favoring national legislation.
Industry’s desire to avoid multiple inconsis-
tent state and local regulations has been a
major impetus for pre-emptive national leg-
islation. It is possible that this could happen
with nano.
Public Participation
Public participation is not so much a tool for
dealing with nano as it is an underlying
requirement.The need to involve the public
permeates all aspects of regulation and must
be considered in connection with all the
tools I have discussed.
There are many publics and many ways in
which they can participate.An important dis-
tinction is between public participation in
specific decisions and public participation in
general policy.The importance of the distinc-
tion was highlighted by the controversy over
agricultural biotechnology. It was not specif-
ic decisions about the risk of specific prod-
ucts or technologies that most disturbed peo-
ple. It was more-general issues such as the
ethics of certain technologies, the roles of sci-
ence and government in society, and the
power of large corporations (Grove-White et
al. 2004). Most of the existing requirements
and much of the current effort devoted to
public participation is, however, focused on
participation in specific decisions.
Specific risk decisions, such as whether to
register a pesticide or to limit the use of a
chemical, in the United States usually are
made by notice-and-comment rulemaking.
EPA (or whatever agency is involved) must
publish a proposed rule and then allow the
public time (usually 60 days) to comment on
it. The agency, when it publishes the final
rule, must respond to the comments it
receives. If the proposed rule is particularly
controversial, the agency may hold a public
hearing to get people’s views.
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The notice-and-comment requirements
provide an important avenue for the public to
be heard. However, they have major limita-
tions. The public involved is usually a small,
and sometimes unrepresentative, subgroup
consisting of those who would be directly
affected economically by the rule and some-
times one or two representatives of the more
general public.The process involves little or no
dialogue or interchange. Public hearings often
do not involve important parts of the public
and usually very little hearing takes place.
In recent years various supplements or
alternatives to notice-and-comment rule-
making have been developed. Regulatory
negotiation (“reg-neg”) has been tried a
number of times. It entails a non-govern-
mental, neutral third party convening the
stakeholders in a decision and having them
reach consensus on the text of the rule.There
is usually an informal agreement that the
government agency will either accept the
text as the proposed rule or at least publish
the text agreed to by the negotiators.There is
some disagreement about whether reg-neg
produces better decisions and whether it
avoids court battles. It is a time-consuming
process for those involved and can be used
only on very important rules.
Other forms of public involvement in spe-
cific decisions have been discussed and occa-
sionally tried. For example, in 2005 the
Nanoscale Science and Engineering Center at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison spon-
sored a citizens’ consensus conference on 
nanotechnology (see www.nsec.wisc.edu).
Another example is the Citizens Technology
Forum on nano, funded by the National
Science Foundation (NSF) and modeled on
the Danish consensus conferences (Hamlett
and Cobb 2006). Also, the Internet has been
utilized as a way of obtaining the views of the
public. For example, PEN is planning to host a
two-day web dialogue to provide an easily
accessible venue for people who have not typ-
ically been engaged in nanotechnology issues
to discuss information and share their thoughts
about nano.Participants in the dialogue will be
able to question a panel of experts and access
online resources about nano.The British think
tank Demos has set up a Nanodialogues proj-
ect blog (www.demos.co.uk/projects/
thenanodialogues/blog), and the Foresight
Nanotech Institute created Nanodot, “the
original nanotechnology weblog” (www.fore
sight.org/nanodot).
Public involvement can be used as an
excuse to delay or avoid a decision. EPA’s
efforts to obtain input for their voluntary
TSCA nano program may or may not be an
example of this.
Advisory committees are the primary
mechanism that federal agencies have used to
obtain advice on general policy. EPA, for
example, has used its National Pollution
Prevention and Toxics Advisory Committee
to get advice about how to deal with nano.
Advisory committees have the advantage of
continuity in membership, which means that
over time the members can become knowl-
edgeable about the issues faced by the
agency, and advisory committees also have
the advantage of allowing real dialogue and
interchange, both among committee mem-
bers and between the members and agency
representatives.
Fair representation on advisory commit-
tees of the major interested parties is required
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA). However, FACA has a number of
deficiencies. It discourages creation of advi-
sory committees by requiring Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) approval of
each new committee. Agencies have learned
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to circumvent FACA’s requirements by using
contractors to run their public-participation
efforts. FACA often has been used by agen-
cies as a way of discouraging public input.
The Act also impedes some kinds of public
participation through requirements such as
that the committee be chaired by a govern-
ment agency official. FACA has been in exis-
tence for several decades, and a review and
revision of it is long overdue.
Participation in general policy questions is
closely related to education.The line between
education and indoctrination can be thin, but
some education about a subject such as nano
can greatly facilitate public participation.False
issues can be avoided and the real issues can
be discussed more intelligently. The NNI is
funding several educational efforts, including
preparation of school materials and support
for a traveling museum exhibition on nano.
These efforts are needed because a significant
majority of the public in the United States
knows nothing, or almost nothing, about
nano (Macoubrie 2005; Hart 2006).
Any effort to involve the public must con-
sider the issue of trust.The American public
does not trust either politicians or corporate
executives (Hart 2006). Participation is an
important way to try to overcome mistrust,
but only if it is sincerely undertaken. Sincere
commitment to hearing the public and a
commitment to being honest with the pub-
lic are prerequisites if some degree of trust is
to be restored.
Reforming Regulation
In this chapter, I have described a variety of
tools that could be used to regulate nano.
Although I have commented on strengths
and weaknesses of the tools, a more system-
atic approach would list a set of criteria for
“good” regulation and then rank the regula-
tory tools on the basis of those criteria.This
kind of systematic evaluation is beyond the
scope of this paper, but in Table 3.2 and
Figure 3.1 I have listed two sets of criteria
that could be used. (For various approaches
to criteria, see U.S. Office of Technology
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TABLE 3.2. CRITERIA FOR GOOD REGULATION
Criterion U.S. Office of TechnologyAssessment (1995)
Davies & Mazurek
(1998)
Cost-effectiveness (efficiency) X X
Fairness (distribution of costs and 
benefits) X X
Fairness (due process)  
(environmental equity and justice)
X X
Minimal demands on government 
(administrative burden)
X
Assurance of meeting goals 
(effectiveness) X X
Adaptability (to new information, 
technology, etc.) X
Technology innovation and diffusion X
Simplicity
Use and encouragement of 
good science
Assessment 1995; Davies and Mazurek 1998;
Sparrow 2000.)
A minimum set of criteria would be
effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness. A regu-
latory approach should accomplish its pur-
pose; it should do so with the fewest
resources necessary to get the job done; and
it should operate fairly, meaning that the
costs and benefits of regulation are distrib-
uted in what is perceived to be a fair manner
and also that legal requirements and due
process are complied with.Table 3.2 expands
this minimum set of criteria, suggesting other
desirable features of a regulatory approach.
Figure 3.1 takes a somewhat different
approach. It divides regulation into three
stages: information for decision, decision,
and implementation. Different criteria are
applicable to different stages. Continuous
feedback from implementation to informa-
tion is crucial, and information must flow
freely and accurately between each stage.
For example, no matter how good the infor-
mation in the first stage, the whole process
can fail if that information is not successful-
ly communicated to those making decisions
in stage two.
There are steps that could be taken to
streamline and improve the current regulato-
ry process. Here I will only mention that
EPA, as well as most federal agencies, has
been slow to make full use of the Internet.
Greater use can be made of the Internet, for
example, by allowing permit applicants to file
online and by utilizing the Internet for com-
ments on proposed regulations and policies.
A new challenge, like nano, opens the pos-
sibility for new approaches to regulation.Many
people have a lot vested in the status quo, and
change is never easy. However, thinking about
new approaches not only can lead to consider-
ing whole new programs but also can stimulate
ideas for improving the existing system.
Some possible new approaches are briefly
discussed below (also see Table 3.3).They over-
lap to some extent, they could be combined in
various ways, they could even be melded
together in a single proposal.They are intend-
ed simply to illustrate the application of some
of the tools discussed above.
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FIGURE 3.1. CRITERIA BY STAGE OF REGULATORY PROCESS
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Collaborative regulation. Manufacturers
of nanomaterials and products containing such
materials would be required to develop a sus-
tainability plan. EPA—perhaps jointly with
FDA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), and the CPSC—would promulgate a
rule that specifies what the content of the plan
should be.The plan would have three compo-
nents: (1) a life cycle analysis of the material
or product; (2) data on toxicity and exposure;
and (3) risk management steps (including
labeling) that the manufacturer will take and
an explanation of why these steps are ade-
quate to prevent unacceptable risks.The plan
would be submitted to EPA (or another
agency if the other agency has jurisdiction),
but it would not be subject to government
approval.The agency would publish a notice
in the FR stating that it had received the plan
and identifying the material covered.The plan
would be reviewed by EPA if a citizen peti-
tion requested review or if there were reason
to suspect that adverse effects are occurring or
that the information in the plan was insuffi-
cient or incorrect. Manufacturers would be
required to report any new information about
possible adverse effects. Strict penalties would
be imposed for marketing a product without
a plan, and EPA would be empowered to take
actions to prevent unacceptable risks. (A vari-
ant of this approach is described in Davies
2006, pp. 18–20.)
Voluntary plan with strict liability.
This approach draws on the Superfund
(CERCLA) model. Manufacturers of nano-
materials and nanoproducts would not be
subject to pre-market review or approval but
would be strictly liable for any health or envi-
ronmental adverse effects caused by their
products.The government would be author-
ized to sue firms for damages under a law
specifying what kind of evidence is required
to demonstrate liability. EPA would be given
resources and legal authority to establish a
monitoring and reporting network sufficient
to detect adverse effects.
Insurance as leverage. The insurance
industry could refuse to insure any nano man-
ufacturer who did not adopt some oversight
system similar to the Environmental Defense–
DuPont framework.This would reduce risk to
insurers as well as provide some protection to
the public. It would supplement, not substitute
for, government regulation. The effort could
be enforced and supported by state insurance
regulators.
Disclosure-based approaches. Similar
to the Berkeley law discussed above, facili-
ties that manufacture or use manufactured
nanomaterials would be required to make
public any known risks of the materials and
what steps are being taken by the manufac-
turer to prevent such risks throughout the
life cycle of the product. EPA, as well as state
and local governments, would be empow-
ered to ensure that firms make the informa-
tion public, that the information is accurate,
and that the risk management steps are ade-
quate. Alternatively, or in addition, an
approach similar to California’s Prop 65
could be used. All nanoproducts would be
required to carry labels identifying them as
nano. EPA and/or other agencies would
promulgate testing requirements for differ-
ent kinds of products. Products that had not
been subject to the required tests would
have to so state on the label, e.g., “This
product has not been tested for adverse
health and environmental effects.”
Labeling and liability. Law professor
Albert Lin (2006) has proposed legislation
that combines several approaches. All manu-
facturers of products containing nanomateri-
als would be required to notify EPA before
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marketing the products, and the products
would have to have a label identifying them
as nano. For products containing nanomate-
rials in a “free” form (i.e., not bound to some
other material), which pose potentially
greater risks, there would be a screening
process, post-marketing monitoring, and a
requirement that the manufacturer post a
bond to cover potential liabilities. This pro-
posal, in my view, has some problems (for
example, I think the bond would have to be
set at such a high figure that it would keep
small companies out of the market), but it
illustrates the useful ideas that can come from
combining different approaches.
Trust but verify. EPA, in cooperation
with other relevant agencies and trade associ-
ations would promulgate specifications for
sector codes of conduct with respect to nano.
These would not be detailed, but would sim-
ply outline content and procedures in gener-
al terms.Trade associations would adopt the
codes. Compliance with the codes would be
verified by EPA or a third party reporting to
EPA. EPA would also promulgate detailed
requirements for nano testing, reporting, and
safeguards. These requirements would apply
to firms not covered by the codes or to firms
that repeatedly were not in compliance.
Coalition. As a variant of the above, EPA
could take the lead in pulling together insur-
ers, venture capitalists, and nano industry
groups to form a Coalition for Responsible
Nanotechnology. The goal of the coalition
would be to have nano manufacturers agree
to follow something like the Environmental
Defense–DuPont Nano Risk Framework.
Those who agreed to do so would be entitled
to use a label indicating compliance.
Questions like third-party certification, public
consultation, and the details of the risk frame-
work would be decided by the coalition.
Regulation with reward. EPA would
establish requirements for testing and report-
ing of nanomaterials and nanoproducts. Any
product that is subjected to the tests and
shows no significant adverse effects could
carry a label saying that the product has met
the EPA requirements for safety. Products
that are tested and show adverse effects
would have to submit to EPA a management
plan to prevent the adverse effects from
occurring. Companies with good testing and
reporting records would be eligible for EPA
technical assistance, would receive advance
notice of available NNI grants, would get
priority for issuance of air and water per-
mits, etc.
Exposure-based regulation. Nano
manufacturers would be required to submit
a life cycle exposure profile of each product
they make. The profile would be reviewed
collaboratively by OSHA, various EPA pro-
grams (air, water, hazardous waste), and any
other relevant agency. Any of the reviewing
agencies, or a designated agency for particu-
lar types of exposures, would have authority
to require steps to limit or manage the expo-
sure if there were reason to believe damage
might result from failure to do so. If there
were direct exposure to humans, the govern-
ment could require the manufacturer to
conduct toxicity testing on the product. If
there were direct environmental exposure,
ecological testing could be required.
In recent years, a number of policy experts
have converged on a group of regulatory
reforms.As summarized by Fiorino (2006, pp.
x–xi), one of the most perceptive environ-
mental analysts, the new environmental regu-
lation “will be based more on performance
than on a narrow definition of compliance. It
will allow regulated firms, especially the bet-
ter performers, more flexibility in determin-
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TABLE 3.3. TOOLS APPLIED IN EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY APPROACHES
Collabor-
ative
regulation
• Manufacturers develop and
submit sustainability plans to
EPA
• Recorded in FR
• Penalties if no plan or adverse
effects not prevented
X
Voluntary 
plan with
strict 
liability
• Superfund model
• Manufacturers strictly liable
for any adverse health or 
environmental effects
• EPA monitors 
X X X
Insurance
as leverage
• Insurers refuse to insure any
nano manufacturer that did
not adopt internal oversight
system
X X
Disclosure-
based
approaches
• Manufacturers make risk infor-
mation public through report-
ing or labeling 
X X X X
Labeling
and liability
• Manufacturers notify EPA 
pre-marketing 
• Screening, post-marketing
review, and bond requirement
for free form nanomaterials 
X X X X
Trust but 
verify
• Industry codes of conduct spec-
ified, adopted, and compliance
verified by EPA or third party
• EPA sets testing, reporting, and
safeguarding requirements
X X
Coalition
• Manufacturers agree to follow
internal oversight system
• Can then label product indicat-
ing compliance
X X X X
Regulation
with reward
• EPA sets testing and reporting
requirements 
• Products carry label if meet
them; if not, producers submit
plan to prevent adverse
effects
• Rewards for good testing and
reporting 
X X X
Exposure-
based 
regulation
• Manufacturers submit life
cycle exposure profiles,
reviewed by OSHA and EPA
• Possible testing required
X
a “Manufacturers” refer to those producing nanomaterials and nanoproducts.
 
ing how to achieve environmental goals. It
will aim to complement the way that business
decisions are made in the private sector rather
than just imposing more legal obligations on
firms . . . [it] will go beyond the conventional
rules-and-deterrence approach and rely on a
more diverse set of policy instruments and
strategies. . . . ”
Many of the premises and conclusions of
this school of thought are insightful and use-
ful. In particular, rapid economic and techno-
logical change and the impoverishment of
government regulatory programs mean that
government cannot possibly direct all com-
panies in a sector to implement specific
remedies. Government cannot know enough
and it cannot move fast enough.
However, other premises of the “new reg-
ulation” are more problematic. Most of the
literature focuses on pollution and media
programs, so its applicability to product reg-
ulation is often unclear. More fundamentally,
there is often an assumption that environ-
mental improvement is in the interests of
most firms, that the “better performers” can
mostly be left on their own to meet environ-
mental requirements, and that the conflict
between the profit motive and environmen-
tal good citizenship is a thing of the past.
While companies are generally more envi-
ronmentally enlightened than they were 30
years ago, I have difficulty accepting these
premises. Profits and good environmental
behavior often conflict. When they do, the
firm’s primary allegiance is to profits. Firms
can survive even if they are bad environmen-
tal citizens, but they cannot survive if they
ignore profit margins and market share.
There are environmentally better com-
panies and worse ones, and some of the bet-
ter ones have made outstanding contribu-
tions to environmental improvement. But
there is a long list of “bad” things associated
with “good” companies—one thinks of
Union Carbide and Bhopal, and BP Amoco
and the leaking Alaska pipeline. In its day,
Enron was considered a “good” company.
Fiorino (2006, p. 16) notes that, “Many
studies confirm that regulation is still the
most important influence on environmental
behavior by firms.”
All of this makes the task of regulatory
reform more difficult. I have sketched some
possibilities above.They could be combined
in various ways, and many other approaches
could be suggested. The ones I have out-
lined are intended only to give some idea of
the variety of directions that could be
explored.
Dialogue Is Necessary
The existing and potential tools for dealing
with nano vary widely, but they share some
underlying choices and trade-offs. The most
basic choice involves the burden of proof.
Should a nano manufacturer be required to
demonstrate to the government that a product
is safe (by conducting prescribed tests) before
the product can be marketed or, conversely,
should the government be required to show
that the product is harmful before it can take
any action? FIFRA is an example of the for-
mer;TSCA is an example of the latter.There
are many intermediate positions, some of
which I have sketched above.
Other trade-offs include obtaining more
complete and detailed information about a
product vs. delay in bringing the product to
market, flexibility in the regulatory regime vs.
predictability, and degree of trust in private
firms vs. government oversight and verification
procedures. All of these are matters of degree:
extreme options for any of them are likely to
be unworkable and unrealistic.
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I have outlined a variety of regulatory
approaches and some criteria for evaluating
them. I have not recommended any particu-
lar approach for two very important reasons.
First, a mix of tools is necessary for both sub-
stantive and political reasons. Second, a dia-
logue among interested parties (including
consumers) is necessary before any oversight
system can be put in place.
No single approach, including traditional
command-and-control regulation, can
accomplish what needs to be done to avoid
adverse effects from a broad technology like
nano.A mix is necessary.Any successful man-
agement regime must contain elements of
information, public participation, and educa-
tion. Most require economic and legal sanc-
tions of various kinds. And voluntary efforts
are required, if only because there can never
be enough resources to monitor and police
everyone. Everything from traffic rules to
medical drug use requires a high degree of
voluntary cooperation to be effective.
A mix of approaches is also often required
for political reasons. Each type of approach
has a different distribution of costs and ben-
efits, and thus a different set of supporters and
opponents.A winning coalition—a sufficient
number of supporters to gain and maintain
acceptance of the program—may require a
mix of tools.
The most desirable mix, and the specifics
of each approach, can be determined only by
those affected by the programs and those
impacted by the absence or inadequacy of
programs. As a policy analyst, I can transmit
the body of experience with programs and
can suggest the likely strengths and weakness-
es of various tools and approaches. However,
the choice of mixes and the specifics of pro-
posed programs are matters of values and pol-
itics, and they require discussion, debate, and
negotiation. Dialogue is necessary, and the
sooner it begins with respect to nano, the bet-
ter off everyone will be.
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In the 1960s and early 1970s, when environ-
ment first became a significant part of the
national agenda, many thought that environ-
mental protection was a transient function.
They believed that society would eliminate
air and water pollution, and that would take
care of the problem. It is now almost univer-
sally recognized that the relationship between
humans and the natural environment cannot
be taken for granted. Environmental protec-
tion must be a continuing and important
responsibility of government. Rather than
disappearing, environmental protection is
likely to become increasingly important as
technology becomes increasingly powerful
and thus gives humans ever more ability to
impact their natural surroundings. Nano is a
prototype of the environmental challenges of
the 21st century.
Responsibility for environmental protec-
tion is widely shared, especially in the United
States. State governments are at least as
important as the federal government. Private
corporations, universities, and non-profit
organizations all have significant roles. Even
within the federal government, EPA’s expen-
ditures are a small part of total funding for
environmental protection. However, as its
name implies, EPA has a central responsibili-
ty. It is the focal point for policy and regula-
tion regarding environmental threats.
EPA’s Problems 
EPA has had a difficult history since it was
cobbled together in 1970 out of a dozen exist-
ing programs. A comprehensive 1998 evalua-
tion of the pollution-control regulatory sys-
tem came to four general conclusions. First,
the fragmented system is seriously broken. Its
effectiveness in dealing with current problems
is questionable, it is inefficient, and it is exces-
sively intrusive. Second, the problems cannot
be fixed by administrative remedies, pilot pro-
grams, or other efforts that tinker at the mar-
gins.They are problems that are built into the
system of laws and institutions that Congress
has enacted over 35 years.Third, the picture is
not all bleak. The system has accomplished
some solid victories in the quest for environ-
mental quality. Fourth, a dearth of information
of all kinds characterizes pollution control.
The system lacks monitoring data to tell
whether environmental conditions are getting
better or worse; it lacks scientific knowledge
about both the causes and the effects of threats
to human and environmental health; and it
lacks information that would tell us which
programs are working and which are not
(Davies and Mazurek 1998, p. 269).
More broadly, a distinguished trio of envi-
ronmental policy experts recently summarized
the premises of the leading environmental
reform efforts as “(1) the need to reconceptu-
alize what the aims and organizing principles
are of environmental governance in the twen-
ty-first century; (2) the need to reconnect . . .
with citizens estranged from or disadvantaged
by the environmental governance process . . . ;
(3) the need to redefine administrative ration-
ality as we have known and practiced it histor-
ically. . .” (Durant et al. 2004, p. xv).
In the context of dealing with nano, the
areas in which major improvements are
needed are agency science, policy integra-
tion, personnel, international cooperation,
and evaluation.
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EPA as a Science Agency
Nano oversight should be based on the gener-
ation and use of the best possible science.
However, throughout its history, EPA’s inter-
nal culture has been dominated by lawyers and
engineers. Scientists have often been consid-
ered peripheral. This internal view has been
reinforced by the outside world, in particular
by other government science agencies, which
often have viewed EPA science as not being of
the highest quality and have questioned
whether a regulatory agency should be doing
any scientific work.The current EPA admin-
istrator is the first scientist to head the agency.
How much impact he will have in changing
the culture remains to be seen.
There are two reasons why EPA should
conduct scientific research.The first is that EPA
programs and regulations require scientific
information, and the information will not be
provided by any other agency. There is no
question that it is very difficult to do high-
quality science in an agency whose primary
function is not research. However, every
attempt to divide regulatory research from a
regulatory agency has failed. The National
Institute for Environmental Health Sciences
(NIEHS), which is part of the National
Institutes of Health, was created to provide
EPA with the health research necessary for
environmental regulations. The arrangement
never worked. The National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health was created to
provide the scientific information needed by
OSHA. OSHA wound up getting most of its
“science” from the labor unions or industry.
The kinds of scientific questions posed by reg-
ulation and the need for interaction between
regulators and scientists require that regulatory
agencies have their own internal scientific
capability.The alternatives are not to regulate or
to regulate using poor and inadequate science.
The other reason for EPA to conduct
research is that there are important areas of
environmental research not covered else-
where. Foremost among these areas are eco-
logical research and research on the effects of
pollutants. In both these areas, EPA research is
considered to be necessary and is deemed to
be of high quality. Both are high-priority
research areas for nano.
If EPA is to become as much a science
agency as a regulatory agency, and I believe
that its becoming so would greatly benefit
both environmental science and regulation,
then it will require an infusion of scientific
resources. The EPA dollars devoted to
research and development now are not
insignificant—about 7% or 8% of the EPA
budget—but science in EPA is eclipsed in
terms of resources, as well as in other ways, by
other agency functions.
The best way to give EPA new scientific
resources would be to transfer one or more
existing environmental science units from
other federal agencies. Likely candidates
include environmental components of some
of the Department of Energy’s independent
laboratories (e.g., Oak Ridge, Argonne,
Brookhaven, Pacific Northwest); portions of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (now part of the Department
of Commerce); and parts of the Geological
Survey in the Department of Interior.Any of
these would have a more logical and congen-
ial home as part of EPA than as part of their
current organizational location.
The internal organization of EPA should
also be changed to reflect the elevated role of
science. A few years ago, the National
Research Council (2000) recommended cre-
ation of a deputy administrator for science and
technology in EPA. The creation of such a
position would send a signal, both within the
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agency and outside it, that EPA was an impor-
tant player in the science world and that it
accorded scientific information the impor-
tance it was due.
The Need for Integration
In 1970, when EPA was created, the staff that
had worked on the reorganization plan creat-
ing the agency also produced a plan for how
the agency should be organized.The organiza-
tional plan called for a functional approach—
there would be an office for research, for
enforcement, for standards, for intergovern-
mental relations, and so forth.The media pro-
grams (air,water, solid waste) would be broken
apart and their functions distributed among
the new offices. When the agency became a
reality,William Ruckelshaus, the first adminis-
trator, went half way towards implementing
the functional plan.However, he balked at dis-
mantling the media offices because of the
imperative of showing early results and the
realistic fear that if they were broken apart it
would be several years before the agency
could start showing concrete progress in
cleaning up the environment. The result was
an agency organized half along functional
lines and half along media lines, an awkward
compromise that has not changed since 1970.
EPA’s internal fragmentation is also driv-
en by the fragmented nature of environmen-
tal law. Each environmental statute is focused
on a particular sub-portion of the environ-
ment and, for the most part, ignores all the
other laws and parts of the environment.
Some of the laws are focused on media, some
are focused on types of products, and some
cut across these categories.The whole is not
more than the sum of the parts.
The advantage of this jumble is that when
a new problem such as nano comes along
there are lots of offices and laws that are
potentially relevant to it. This is a disadvan-
tage, however, because it makes a coordinated,
integrated approach to the problem difficult
to formulate and achieve.
The internal EPA problems are com-
pounded by the multitude of agencies
involved in nano.As noted earlier, 25 agencies
participate in the NNI.For preventing adverse
effects as well as for research, EPA needs to
take account of what other agencies are doing.
Obviously, to the extent that EPA is not inter-
nally coordinated it makes it more difficult for
it to coordinate with other agencies.
The best solution for the fragmentation
within EPA would be to have a single, inte-
grated environmental protection law. This is
theoretically possible (I have drafted such a law
[see Conservation Foundation 1988]) but
politically impossible.To deal with nano, it will
be necessary for the agency to have an
agency-wide plan that specifies what each
EPA office will do and how it relates to other
offices and other agencies. The decision to
make the Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxics the lead office is an important first step
in such a coordinated strategy.
EPA’s relations with other agencies are
more problematic. NNI is intended to serve
as the federal government-wide coordinator
for nano, and it has established a Nano-
technology Environmental and Health
Implications (NEHI) Working Group whose
purpose is, in part, to coordinate the work of
the regulatory agencies. However, the mem-
bers of the NEHI mostly come from the
research parts of their agencies, and NNI is
much more focused on science and research
than on regulation.Also, the overall emphasis
of NNI on promoting nano creates a tension
with any consideration of regulating nano.
It would be desirable for EPA to initiate
discussions with the FDA, OSHA, and CPSC
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about coordinating and sharing relevant
information about nano.This would serve to
supplement, not replace, NNI’s coordination.
Getting Good People
Institutions, administrative structures, and
laws are important determinants of whether
a government agency functions well. But no
organization can work well without compe-
tent leadership and good employees.This has
always been a problem for U.S. government
agencies. The problem is compounded with
respect to nano because the relative newness
of the subject means that few people have
experience or training in dealing with nano.
Getting and retaining good employees is
particularly a problem for EPA. Many, perhaps
most, EPA employees have been motivated
largely by dedication to environmental pro-
tection and public health. Many of the origi-
nal leaders and experts were officers in the
Public Health Service, a semi-military corps
with its own personnel system and its own
perquisites. There are still about 75 Public
Health Service officers on detail to EPA. A
whole generation of civil servants who have
been with EPA since it started in 1970 is now
retiring. How will they be replaced?
There is a large literature on the civil serv-
ice, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to
review it. I will note only that it is hard to see
what would attract good people to go to work
for EPA or any other federal agency.The pay
is significantly below what most potential
employees could get in the private sector. Job
security, which used to be an attraction, is less
certain now—layoffs and arbitrary transfers
occur with increasing frequency. Dedication
to benefiting society remains an important
motive, but after 25 years of politicians identi-
fying government as part of the problem
rather than part of the solution, the impor-
tance of this motive has been reduced. If soci-
ety wants to attract good people to work for
the government, it is going to have to figure
out better ways to attract them.
Agency heads can influence the quality of
the civil service by their rhetoric, by their
own leadership, and by the quality of the
appointments they make. Good leadership
can inspire an entire agency. Bad leadership
can erode morale and scar an agency for
many years.The president, Congress, and the
American electorate share responsibility for
the quality of agency leaders.
At present, there is a vicious downward
spiral at work. As the quality of government
employees declines, the competence of the
agency deteriorates, it becomes harder to
attract good civil servants, and agency com-
petence deteriorates still further.
One way of getting around the problem of
attracting good government employees is to
contract with the private sector for the per-
formance of functions that formerly were per-
formed by civil servants.There is no limit to
what kinds of functions can be contracted out.
In Iraq, we are seeing a war in which almost
half the U.S. personnel are civilian contractors.
Since its inception, EPA has done a lot of
contracting with the private sector. In part
this is because OMB and Congress ration
both money and personnel slots, and for EPA,
money has often been more available than
slots. It is also because of the broad range of
expertise needed to implement the environ-
mental laws.The laws touch every economic
sector, so if, for example, the agency wants an
expert in water pollution control in the steel
industry, or an expert in waste management
in paper mills, it makes more sense for EPA to
contract with an expert in the private sector
than to hire and retain experts in all the areas
it covers. By contracting, the agency can buy
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not only expertise but also credibility with
the regulated industry, which often uses the
same contractors.
However, there are significant drawbacks
to contracting. In many cases, it is more
expensive to use contactors than government
personnel. Contractors’ work is usually less
transparent and less responsible to the public
than work done in-house. Contractors may
be less familiar with the requirements of gov-
ernment policy processes than civil servants.4
As with the civil service, there is a large lit-
erature on contracting out government func-
tions, and it is beyond this paper to analyze it.
For EPA, contracting will likely remain an
important element in meeting the agency’s
personnel needs. Nano is an area where con-
sultants and contractors can give the agency
some of the expertise it requires.
The International Context
International cooperation is a requirement for
dealing successfully with nano, but EPA suffers
from at least two impediments in dealing with
international matters.The first is the structure
and traditions of the federal government,
which give primacy in international matters to
the State Department. In recent years, as inter-
national meetings and negotiations increasing-
ly have involved specialized knowledge, this
primacy has been eroded. Leadership in inter-
national meetings is now often the responsibil-
ity of the substantive agency. For example, Dr.
Jim Willis, Director of the EPA Chemicals
Control Division, chairs the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Working Party on Manufactured
Nanomaterials (described below). However,
especially for major environmental meetings,
there is still jockeying for primacy between
State and EPA.
The other, and probably more serious,
impediment has been the indifference of some
EPA leaders to the international dimension of
environmental problems. William Reilly, the
EPA administrator from 1989 to 1993, cared
deeply about international environmental
matters, and he elevated the EPA International
Office to the same level as the media (air,
water) offices. However, some of his predeces-
sors and successors have shown a remarkable
lack of concern for the role of other countries
and international organizations and a notable
insensitivity to the international dimension of
EPA’s responsibilities. Currently the EPA
Office of International Affairs has a grand total
of 77 FTEs, less than half of one percent of
agency employees.
International cooperation on nano is
essential because the amount of research and
testing needed for nano exceeds the capacity
of any one country, even the United States.
Testing of nanoproducts should be supple-
mented by reporting of any adverse effects
resulting from using the products, and this
reporting needs to be worldwide. Nano regu-
latory requirements will also require coopera-
tion among nations. Both the manufacture
and the marketing of nanoproducts is likely to
involve many countries. No regulatory effort
will work if it does not deal successfully with
imports and exports of nano materials and
products. It is probably unrealistic in the short
term to have an internationally harmonized
regulatory scheme for nano.However, the lack
of regulatory harmonization will likely result
in both economic distortions and greater risk
to health and the environment.
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The primary international effort on nano
is in the OECD, which includes Europe, the
United States, Canada, and Japan.The OECD
Chemicals Committee has established a
Working Party on Manufactured Nano-
materials. The first meeting of the Working
Party was in October 2006, and it is sched-
uled to meet again in April 2007. Its Program
of Work addresses three main areas: (1) iden-
tification, characterization, definitions, termi-
nology and standards; (2) testing methods and
risk assessment; and (3) information sharing,
cooperation, and dissemination. The OECD
intends, among other activities, to develop a
global strategy for environmental health and
safety research on manufactured nanomateri-
als and to establish a database of such research
(Nanowerk News, 1/11/07).
In February 2007, the United States and
the European Union signed an agreement to
cooperate on various aspects of environmen-
tal research (Nanowerk News, 2/9/07). “Uses
and impacts of nanotechnology” was promi-
nently listed as one of the topics.
Cooperation under the agreement is expect-
ed to take many forms, including direct col-
laboration on research, joint sponsorship of
conferences, and exchanges of information
and data.
There is no existing formal effort to coop-
erate internationally on nano regulation in part
because no nation has established regulations
primarily directed at nano. The OECD
Working Party intends to be a forum for
exchanging information on national regulato-
ry programs and voluntary regulatory schemes.
The European Commission recently has
enacted a far-reaching regulatory approach for
chemicals, REACH (Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals,
Directive 2006/121/EC), but it contains noth-
ing specific about nano. There is uncertainty
about how and to what extent it will cover
nano since its requirements are based primari-
ly on the volume of a substance produced (see
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/reach).
The international dimension should get
more attention and priority within EPA. It
becomes ever clearer that no nation can suc-
cessfully deal with environmental problems on
its own. The issues raised by nano show, in
part, why this is true.
Evaluating Programs, 
Measuring Progress
Rational public policy requires program evalu-
ation.Without an ongoing evaluation function
there is no way of telling whether programs are
working,whether the agency’s mission is being
accomplished, or how agency activities can be
improved in the future.
Despite the obvious need for evaluation,
the evaluation capability of most federal agen-
cies has steadily eroded. EPA used to have a
policy office that evaluated programs and
prodded the agency to take a more integrated
approach. Administrator Carol Browner abol-
ished the office, and none of her successors has
seen a need to re-create it. EPA, like most
agencies, now has essentially no internal capa-
bility to determine whether its programs are
working. (A partial exception in EPA and
other agencies is the inspector generals’ offices.
However, these offices usually focus only on
cases of negligence and criminal activity. Also,
EPA has a small evaluation group within what
is left of the policy office, but it has fewer than
10 people.)
Evaluation is difficult to perform within
an agency because it is often a form of self-
criticism and because, in the short run, it
takes resources away from the direct per-
formance of program functions.The erosion
of evaluation throughout the government has
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resulted from a long period of scarce
resources combined with a general climate of
caring more about united fronts and public
relations than about whether an agency’s job
was getting done.
The Government Accountability Office
(GAO), an arm of Congress that maintains a
good deal of independence, continues to do
high quality evaluations of federal programs.
Within the Executive Branch, there are two
efforts devoted to evaluation—the Gover-
nment Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
and the Program Assessment and Rating Tool
(PART).
GPRA, the culmination of a long line of
programs that began in the Department of
Defense in the 1960s, attempts to provide a
system whereby each agency establishes pro-
gram goals and measures its progress toward
reaching them. Ideally, the GPRA bench-
marks are tied to the agency’s budget, so
Congress and the public can know what they
are buying with appropriated funds. Many
agencies, including EPA, have found it diffi-
cult to establish a close connection between
GPRA and the budget. The goals in EPA’s
five-year Strategic Plan (www.epa.gov/
ocfo/plan/2006/), required by GPRA,
mention nanotechnology both as an environ-
mental asset and as a potential source of novel
risks. However, the goals are vaguely worded,
not quantifiable in any way, and overall not
much use either for evaluation or for strate-
gic planning.
PART is administered by OMB. It rates
selected government programs on several
dimensions and gives the detailed results on a
very accessible website (www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/part).At present, it contains noth-
ing specifically related to nano.PART has rated
51 EPA programs.The majority, 33 programs,
were rated “adequate,” meaning that the pro-
grams need to “set more ambitious goals,
achieve better results, improve accountability
or strengthen . . . management practices.” No
EPA programs got the highest rating, “effec-
tive.”Twelve were rated “moderately effective,”
three were rated “ineffective,” and three were
categorized as “results not demonstrated.”
If EPA is to be responsible for nano over-
sight, it needs to establish measures of
progress and be able to evaluate the extent to
which progress is being made. I suggest that
EPA should consider using four measures to
assess its nano efforts:
1. the number of substances (or products)
that have been tested for adverse effects as
a proportion of those that need to be test-
ed—one aspect of the adequacy of knowl-
edge about nano health and environmen-
tal effects;
2. the incidence of actual adverse effects
from nano—at the moment, as far as we
know, this number is zero;
3. the dollar growth in nano manufacturing
and/or sales—this serves both as a meas-
ure of EPA’s task and as a reminder that
the effort to ensure safety needs to be
tempered by minimal interference with
the development of the technology; and 
4. a measure of the number of green nano-
products.
The data for each of these measures will
be difficult to collect, and undoubtedly the
measures will be modified or altered in the
light of experience. However, the principle
that the agency should track such measures
and make them public on a regular basis is
fundamental.
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EPA should also re-establish an internal
evaluation capability. This is necessary not
only to do evaluation but also to give the
administrator some control over agency pro-
grams and thereby provide greater integra-
tion among programs. Technologies such as
nano do not fit neatly into the agency boxes
established to implement the separate envi-
ronmental laws. They require interaction
among the different EPA programs.This will
be even truer if the science capability of EPA
is enlarged.The agency needs a policy office
to cope with nano.
A policy office could also assist EPA in
broadening its mission from environmental
protection to sustainable development.
Sustainable development is a much abused
term which has been given many meanings.
I am using it to encompass three dimensions:
environmental protection, economic devel-
opment, and equity.The term was originally
popularized by the 1987 report of the World
Commission on Environment and Develo-
pment.The commission defined it as “devel-
opment that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.” The
International Institute for Environment and
Development (1996, p. 5) elaborated this to
be a development path that is socially desir-
able, economically viable, and ecologically
sustainable.
This definition of sustainable develop-
ment is relevant to EPA and nano because,
while recognizing the agency’s responsibility
for protecting health and the environment
from any adverse effects of nano, it would
also acknowledge the responsibility of the
agency not to unduly impede nano’s eco-
nomic development. The equity element is
relevant in acknowledging EPA’s responsibil-
ity to encourage the application of nano for
beneficial uses, such as green nano products.
It also recognizes the agency’s concern for
“environmental justice.”
I have sketched a vision of a new EPA—
stronger in science, far more integrated,
aware of its international responsibilities,
capable of evaluating its efforts and measur-
ing its progress, and inspired by a new vision
of sustainable development. None of this will
happen easily or quickly. But nano, the tech-
nology of the future, can provide an oppor-
tunity to create the EPA of the future. Nano,
EPA, and future technological development
will benefit if this happens.
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Throughout this report, I have described steps
that, in my view, should be taken to ensure the
safety and progress of nanotechnology. I have
also referred to proposals made by others that
would further creation of an oversight system
for nano. In this chapter, I pull these proposals
together to describe an action agenda for nano.
The chapter is organized into actions that
should be taken in the next one or two years,
the next two to five years, and the more dis-
tant future. Items are numbered for ease of
reference and the numbers do not indicate
any priority.Within each time period, I have
organized the items loosely by their primary
focus—research, regulation, and other.
Unlike the list of possible regulatory
approaches in Chapter III, the list of next
steps is not a matter of picking and choosing.
All of the next steps should be taken.
The most important steps relate to the
establishment of an adequate oversight sys-
tem.This effort should proceed on two fronts.
The first is using TSCA in its current form.
Deficient as it is,TSCA is still the only exist-
ing law that can serve as the basis of a gener-
al oversight system for nano. EPA should
revise the TSCA regulations to better deal
with nano (recommendations #7 and #8)
and it should launch its voluntary program
(#6) to improve its ability to know what
information on nano to collect and how to
analyze the information. Using TSCA for
nano oversight will also require coordination
both within EPA (#9) and between EPA and
other regulatory agencies (#10).
The other front is longer range. It involves
fixing the major problems with TSCA, which
requires legislation (#23), and the formulation
of new and better oversight approaches (#5
and #15). Although the outcome of the
attempt to develop better approaches cannot
be predicted, the formulation of such
approaches is essential and pressing.
The other two priority areas are research
and improving EPA. The need for more
research on nano and for giving more focus
to the research being done has been well doc-
umented by others (see Maynard 2006a,
2006c). More progress has to be made on
understanding whether nano has adverse
health and environmental effects, what the
effects are, and what characteristics of nano
materials and products are associated with any
adverse effects. A number of next steps are
directed at obtaining this knowledge.
In Chapter IV, I described several areas in
which EPA needs to change if it is to success-
fully meet the challenge of overseeing nano.
Formulating detailed recommendations to
bring these changes about will require
obtaining a lot of information from EPA and
stakeholders and doing a lot of thinking.
Therefore, I recommend (#16) that a com-
mission be established to consider and make
recommendations to revitalize EPA.
The next steps are described below (and
listed in Table 5.1). The agenda is long, and
many of the proposals will be difficult to get
approved and implemented.The challenge is
important. For those of us concerned with
making sure that society reaps the benefits of
nano while not causing harm to people or
the environment, there is no shortage of
work to do.
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V. Next Steps 
 
One to Two Years
Research
1. NNI should immediately revise its existing
research plan for nano health and environ-
mental effects, drawing on the expertise of
non-governmental nano researchers.
2. The National Nanotechnology for the
Twenty-First Century Act (117 Stat1923)
should be amended to require NNI to issue
a research plan for health and environmental
effects every three years and to circulate the
plan for public comment before finalizing it.
3. EPA and/or the NIEHS should initiate dis-
cussions with major nano companies about
creation of a joint government-industry insti-
tute, the Nanotechnology Effects Institute, to
conduct scientific research on the effects of
nano.The new institution could be modeled
on the Health Effects Institute, which was
created by EPA and the automobile industry.
4. Funding for strategically targeted research on
health and environmental effects of nano
should be increased to at least $50 million
annually.
Regulation
5. NNI, PEN, the Congressional Nano Caucus,
or some other group should convene indus-
try, environmental groups, and other stake-
holders to begin a dialogue, facilitated by a
neutral third party, to discuss the optimal form
of oversight for nano.The group should coor-
dinate with Congress and the relevant federal
agencies, and they in turn should set a dead-
line for the group to agree on specific recom-
mendations and next steps for nano oversight.
6. EPA should launch its nano voluntary pro-
gram.
7. EPA should formulate changes to TSCA to
deal with nano. These should include both
changes in regulations (e.g., low-volume
exemption) and changes in the law (see #23).
The changes in regulation should be imple-
mented.
8. EPA should promulgate a significant new 
use rule under TSCA that covers all nanoma-
terials.
9. EPA should formulate and implement an
internal coordination plan for nano. The
plan should delineate the responsibilities of
each EPA office with respect to nano. In
cases of overlap (e.g., FIFRA and the CWA
with respect to silver washing machines),
the plan should decide how the cases will be
handled.
10. EPA should work with FDA, OSHA,
CPSC, and USDA to create an interagency
nano regulatory coordinating group. This
group should meet approximately monthly
to formulate and coordinate regulatory
actions with respect to nano. It should
agree on which agency has the lead in cases
of overlapping jurisdiction and, to the
extent that it is reasonable, it should agree
on uniform ways to treat nano products
and materials.
11. Congress should request that the GAO, in
cooperation with the State Department,
conduct a study of what other nations are
doing with respect to nano regulation and
oversight.
12. The NNI should establish and publish met-
rics to evaluate the success of the program.
The measures should be updated annually.
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13. The NNI, perhaps with funding from NSF,
should commission a study, or series of
studies, on the economics of nano. The
studies should examine the likely impact of
nano on the U.S. economy, identify the
areas of the economy most likely to be
affected by nano, and analyze the econom-
ic impact of the NNI and how net benefits
can be maximized.
14. The NNI should commission a study of
the pros and cons of labeling nanomateri-
als and nanoproducts. The study should
consider the effectiveness, cost, and feasi-
bility of labeling, and also consider alterna-
tive types of labels and the extent to which
different types of nanoproducts should be
covered.
15. Congressional leaders should establish a
new temporary committee in each house to
consider options for a regulatory mecha-
nism for nano. The House and Senate
groups should facilitate coordination among
the relevant committees in each house,
including the conduct of joint hearings on
nano oversight by the relevant committees.
Other
16. The president and the congressional lead-
ership should convene an EPA Modern-
ization Commission. The commission
should be composed of experts from out-
side the government, including experts
from business and from the environmental
community. It should consider how to
update environmental law, how to improve
the functioning of EPA, and how to
address future environmental problems.
The commission’s mandate should include
consideration of both existing and new
legislation.
17. Congress should commission GAO to do a
study of what resources (dollars, FTEs,
expertise) federal agencies are currently
devoting to nano health and safety, both
research and regulation. (In March 2007,
the Senate Commerce Committee sent
GAO a letter asking it to do such a study.)
Congress should then conduct a hearing to
consider whether these resources are ade-
quate.
18. NNI, with funding primarily from NSF,
should increase its public education and
participation efforts.A primer on nanotech,
aimed at lay audiences, should be produced
and widely distributed. An Internet dia-
logue and chat room on nano should be
started. Consideration should be given to
holding televised town meeting and science
court sessions on nano.
19. EPA should re-establish a policy office with
responsibilities for coordinating agency
programs, program evaluation, and measur-
ing progress toward agency goals.
20. Congress should hold hearings for the pur-
pose of amending the Federal Advisory
Committee Act to update the Act and to
facilitate public participation.
Two to Five Years
Research
21. The National Nanotechnology Act should
be amended to provide a mechanism that
facilitates NNI funding the priorities it
identifies. One mechanism, for example,
would be to establish a separate pot of
money (5–10% of agency nano budgets)
distributed by the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) and OMB to
fill gaps identified in the NNI research
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plans. An alternative would be to have an
NNI steering committee (including
OMB and OSTP) that was authorized to
reallocate a certain percentage of each
agency’s budget to better meet NNI-iden-
tified priorities.
22. The Nanotechnology Effects Institute
should begin operation. Congress should
provide separate funding for the Institute
in the EPA or NIEHS budget.
Regulation
23. Congress should amend TSCA.
A. It should delete the constraints that
make rulemaking nearly impossible.
EPA should not be required to show
that a rule uses “the least burdensome
requirements” (sec. 6(a)). EPA should
not have to show that the risk being
regulated could not be sufficiently
reduced under any other federal law
(sec. 6c(1)).
B. It should change the criterion for
judicial review to the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard that is used for
most other federal regulations instead
of “supported by substantial evidence
in the rulemaking record.”
C. It should amend the part of the Act
allowing EPA to require testing of a
substance (section 4) to make clear
that the absence of data is sufficient
evidence that the substance may pres-
ent an unreasonable risk.This would
allow EPA to require a manufacturer
to produce enough data to determine
whether a chemical actually was an
unreasonable risk.
D. It should authorize EPA to share con-
fidential business information with
states and foreign governments,provid-
ed the data are adequately protected.
24. The recommendations of the EPA
Modernization Commission should be
considered for implementation.
25. Relevant trade associations, such as the
American Chemistry Council and the
Nanotechnology Business Alliance,
should establish industry codes of con-
duct related to nano. The codes should
cover testing, safe handling, and require-
ments for suppliers and customers. The
codes should be open to public review
before being made final, and compliance
with the codes should be subject to
third-party verification.
26. EPA, working with the State Department
and other relevant agencies, should fully
support the OECD mechanisms for
exchange of nano research results.
Beyond Five Years
Crystal balls get cloudy when trying to fore-
see more than five years ahead. The only
thing that can be said with certainty is that
the political, cultural, and technological land-
scape is likely to look different in 2012 or
2015 than it does now.
If the general argument of this paper is
accepted, then over the next five years a
coordinated and effective oversight system
for nano should be put in place. Whether it
will be able to adjust to the rapid evolution
of the technology will be its severest test.
A major thrust of this report has been that
nano can serve as the catalyst for a born-
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Proposed Agenda Items for the Next 1 to 2 Years 
1. NNI revise its research plan for nano health and environmental effects.
2. Congress amend the National Nanotechnology for the Twenty-First Century Act to require NNI to issue a
research plan for health and environmental effects every three years.
3. EPA and/or NIEHS initiate discussions with nano companies about creation of a joint government-industry
nano effects research institute.
4. Congress increase funding for strategically targeted research on health and environmental effects of nano to
at least $50 million annually.
5. Industry, environmental groups, and other stakeholders begin a dialogue.
6. EPA launch its nano voluntary program.
7. EPA formulate changes to TSCA to deal with nano. 
8. EPA promulgate a significant new use rule under TSCA that covers all nanomaterials.
9. EPA formulate and implement an internal coordination plan for nano. 
10. EPA work with FDA, OSHA, CPSC, and USDA to create an interagency nano regulatory 
coordinating group. 
11. Congress request that the GAO conduct a study of what other nations are doing with respect to nano 
regulation and oversight.
12. NNI establish and publish evaluation metrics.
13. NNI commission a study on the economics of nano. 
14. NNI commission a study of the pros and cons of labeling nanomaterials and nanoproducts. 
15. Congress establish a temporary committee in each house to consider options for a regulatory 
mechanism for nano. 
16. The president and Congress convene an EPA Modernization Commission. 
17. Congress commission GAO to study what resources federal agencies are currently devoting to nano
health and safety, both research and regulation, and then conduct a hearing to consider whether these
resources are adequate.
18. NNI, with funding primarily from NSF, increase its public education and participation efforts.
19. EPA re-establish a policy office with responsibilities for coordinating agency programs, evaluating 
programs and measuring progress toward agency goals.
20. Congress hold hearings to amend the Federal Advisory Committee Act to facilitate public participation.
21. Congress amend the National Nanotechnology Act to facilitate NNI funding the priorities it identifies. 
22. The Nanotechnology Effects Institute begin operation; Congress provide separate funding for the Institute
in the EPA or NIEHS budget.
23. Congress amend TSCA to remove the constraints that make rulemaking nearly impossible, to change 
the criterion for judicial review to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, to require manufacturers to
produce enough data, and to authorize EPA to share confidential business information with states and
foreign governments, provided the data are adequately protected.
24. The White House consider the recommendations of the EPA Modernization Commission for implementation.
25. Trade associations establish industry codes of conduct related to nano. 
26. EPA, working with the State Department and other relevant agencies, fully support the OECD 
mechanisms for exchange of nano research results. 
Proposed Agenda Items for the Next 2 to 5 Years 
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TABLE 5.1. PROPOSED ACTIONS (NUMBERS REFER TO ACTION ITEMS IN TEXT)
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Note: For acronyms used, see list at end of report.
Row shading corresponds with lead organization for each action item.  
Key: NNI = n Congress = n EPA = n White House = n Nano industry = n
again EPA. In five years, we could hope to see
the beginnings of an agency with a new mis-
sion, an improved competence, and new ener-
gy and dedication.
A summary list of the proposals is provid-
ed in Table 5.1.Table 5.2 summarizes which
organizations should take the lead in initiat-
ing action.
My hope is that this report, by planting a
few ideas and stimulating a few activities, will
contribute to realizing these changes. Nano is
on the verge of having a huge positive impact
on our lives. It can improve our health,
increase energy supplies, facilitate environ-
mental cleanup in rich countries, and provide
potable water in poor countries.The possibil-
ities are hard to exaggerate, but they rest on a
major vulnerability—the lack of an adequate
oversight system to deal with potential
adverse health and environmental effects.We
need to remedy this vulnerability to secure
the benefits of the technology.
Nano has great promise and presents great
challenges. If we can meet its challenges, we
will ensure that its promise will be fulfilled.
64
TABLE 5.2. ACTION ITEMS BY LEAD ORGANIZATION (NUMBERS REFER TO ACTION
ITEMS IN TEXT)
Lead Organization 1–2 Years 2–5 Years
Congress 2,4,11,15,16,17,20 21,22,23
President 16 24
NNI 1,12,13,14,18
EPA 3,6,7,8,9,10,19 26
Nano industry 3,5 25
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006a.“CAA Nanotechnology Briefing
Paper,” Section Nanotechnology Project,
June (available at www.abanet.org/
environ/nanotech/)
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006b.“CERCLA Nanotechnology
Issues.” Section Nanotechnology Project,
June (available at www.abanet.org/
environ/nanotech/)
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006c.“CWA Nanotechnology Briefing
Paper.” Section Nanotechnology Project,
June (available at www.abanet.org/
environ/nanotech/)
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006d.“EMS/Innovative Regulatory
Approaches.” Section Nanotechnology
Project, June (available at www.abanet.
org/environ/nanotech/)
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006e.“The Adequacy of FIFRA to
Regulate Nanotechnology-Based
Pesticides.” Section Nanotechnology
Project, June (available at www.abanet.
org/environ/nanotech/)
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006f.“RCRA Regulation of Wastes from
the Production, Use, and Disposal of
Nanomaterials.” Section Nanotechnology
Project, June (available at www.abanet.
org/environ/nanotech/)
American Bar Association, Section of 
Environment, Energy, and Resources,
2006g.“Regulation of Nanoscale
Materials under the Toxic Substances
Control Act.” Section Nanotechnology
Project, June (available at www.abanet.
org/environ/nanotech/)
ASTM International, 2006. Standard 
E-2456-06,“Terminology for 
Nanotechnology,” (available at
www.astm.org)
Berube, David M., 2006.“Regulating 
Nanoscience:A Proposal and a Response
to J. Clarence Davies,” Nanotechnology
Law and Business, 3(4):485–506 (Dec.)
Bray, Hiawatha, 2007.“Cambridge 
Considers Nanotech Curbs,” Boston
Globe, Jan. 26 (available at www.boston.
com/business/technology/)
Chen, Z. et al., 2006.“Acute Toxicological 
Effects of Copper Nanoparticles in vivo,”
Toxicology Letters, 163:109–120
Coglianese, Cary, and Jennifer Nash, eds.,
2001. Regulating from the Inside,
Washington, D.C., Resources for the
Future
Coglianese, Cary, and Jennifer Nash, eds.,
2006. Leveraging the Private Sector,
Washington, D.C., Resources for the
Future
Conservation Foundation, 1988.“The 
Environmental Protection Act” (ms. in
author’s possession)
Davies, J. Clarence, and Jan Mazurek, 1998.
Pollution Control in the United States
Washington, D.C., Resources for the
Future
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